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Abstract
Consensus protocols for asynchronous networks are usu-
ally complex and inefficient, leading practical systems
to rely on synchronous protocols. This paper attempts
to simplify asynchronous consensus by building atop a
novel threshold logical clock abstraction, which enables
upper layers to operate as if on a synchronous network.
This approach yields an asynchronous consensus proto-
col for fail-stop nodes that may be simpler and more ro-
bust than Paxos and its leader-based variants, requiring
no common coins and achieving consensus in a constant
expected number of rounds. The same approach can be
strengthened against Byzantine failures by building on
well-established techniques such as tamper-evident log-
ging and gossip, accountable state machines, threshold
signatures and witness cosigning, and verifiable secret
sharing. This combination of existing abstractions and
threshold logical clocks yields a modular, cleanly-layered
approach to building practical and efficient Byzantine
consensus, distributed key generation, time, timestamp-
ing, and randomness beacons, and other critical services.
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1 Introduction
Consensus protocols tend to be delicate and complex,
despite numerous attempts to simplify or reformulate
them [22,82,99,124,134]. They become even more com-
plex and fragile when we want them to tolerate Byzan-
tine node failures [10,20,39,43,44,95,166], and/or asyn-
chronous network conditions [3, 32, 33, 46, 47, 60, 116,
120]. Because relying on synchrony assumptions and
timeouts can make consensus protocols vulnerable to per-
formance attacks [6,44] and routing-based attacks [7], we
would prefer to allow for both adversarial nodes and an
adversarial network.
This paper explores a new approach to asynchronous
consensus that decomposes the handling of time from the
consensus process itself. We introduce TLC, a new thresh-
old logical clock protocol, which synthesizes a virtual no-
tion of time on an asynchronous network. Other protocols,
including consensus protocols, may then be built more
simply atop TLC as if on a synchronous network. This
layering is thus conceptually related to Awerbuch’s idea
of synchronizers [13], but TLC is designed to operate in
the presence of failed or Byzantine nodes.
TLC is inspired in part by Lamport clocks [97, 132],
vector clocks [63,66,105,114,132],andmatrix clocks [59,
132, 140, 141, 165]. While these classic notions of vir-
tual time label an unconstrained event history to en-
able before/after comparisons, TLC in contrast labels and
constrains events to ensure that a threshold of nodes
in a group progress through logical time in a quasi-
synchronous “lock-step” fashion. In particular, a TLC
node reaches time step s + 1 only after a threshold of
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all participants has reached time s and a suitable thresh-
old amount of round-trip communication has demonstra-
bly occurred since then. A particular protocol instance
TLC(tm, tw, n) is parameterized by message threshold
tm, witness threshold tw, and number of nodes n. This
means that to reach time s + 1, a node i must have re-
ceived messages broadcast at time s by at least tm of the
n nodes, and i must have seen each of those tm messages
acknowledged by at least tw of the n nodes. In a Byzan-
tine environment, TLC ensures that malicious nodes can-
not advance their clocks either “too fast” (running ahead
of honest nodes) or “too slow” (trailing behind the major-
ity without catching up).
We find that it becomes simpler to build other use-
ful protocols atop TLC’s logical notion of time, such as
threshold signing, randomness beacons, and consensus.
To explore TLC’s usefulness for this purpose, we develop
an approach to consensus we call que sera consensus or
QSC. In QSC, the participants each propose a potential
value to agree on (e.g., a block in a blockchain), then sim-
ply “wait” a number of TLC time steps, recording and
gossiping their observations at each step. After the ap-
propriate number of logical time steps have elapsed, the
participants decide independently on the basis of public
randomness and the history they observed whether the
consensus round succeeded and, if so, which value was
agreed on. This “propose, gossip, decide” approach re-
lates to recent DAG-based blockchain consensus propos-
als [16, 52, 102, 127], which reinvent and apply classic
principles of secure timeline entanglement [113] and ac-
countable state machines [78, 79]. The approach to con-
sensus we propose attempts to clarify and systematize this
direction in light of existing tools and abstractions.
To handle network asynchrony, including adversarial
scheduling, our observation is that it is sufficient to as-
sociate random tickets with each proposed value or block
for symmetry-breaking, while ensuring that the network
adversary cannot learn the random ticket values until the
communication pattern defining the consensus round has
been completed and indelibly fixed. In a Paxos-equivalent
version of the consensus protocol for n = 2f + 1
well-behaved, “fail-stop” nodes (Section 4), we ensure
this network adversary obliviousness condition simply
by encrypting each node’s self-chosen ticket (e.g., via
TLS [135]), keeping it secret from the network adversary
until the consensus round’s result is a fait accompli.
To tolerate f Byzantine nodes colluding with the net-
work adversary, as usual we need n = 3f + 1 nodes
total [125, 142]. We rely on gossip and transferrable au-
thentication (digital signatures), and treat all participants
as accountable state machines in the PeerReview frame-
work [78, 79] to handle equivocation and other detectable
misbehavior by faulty nodes. We use threshold public ran-
domness [33,36,154] via secret sharing [144,145,152] to
ensure that the adversary can neither learn nor bias pro-
posal ticket values until the round has completed.
These tools simplify the construction of asynchronous
Byzantine consensus protocols. QSC3 (Section 4) builds
on the TLC protocol configuredwith the message and wit-
ness thresholds tm = tw = 2f+1, i.e.,TLC(2f+1, 2f+
1, 3f+1). The protocol is attractive for its simplicity and
clean layering, and for the fact that it requires no common
coins or trusted dealers.
2 Threshold Logical Clocks (TLC)
We now introduce TLC and explore its properties infor-
mally, emphasizing simplicity and clarity of exposition.
For now we consider only the non-Byzantine situation
where only the network’s scheduling of message delivery,
and none of the participating nodes themselves, may ex-
hibit adversarial behavior. We leave Byzantine node fail-
ures to be addressed later in Section 5.
2.1 TLC as a Layer of Abstraction
In the tradition of layered network architectures [41,168],
TLC’s main purpose is to provide a layer that simplifies
the construction of interesting higher-lever protocols atop
it. Building atop a fully-asynchronous underlying net-
work, in particular, TLC offers a coordinating group of
nodes the abstraction of a simple synchronous network in
which time appears to advance for all participants in lock-
step through consecutive integer time-steps (1, 2, 3, . . . ).
TLC’s synchronous network abstraction is analogous to
that provided by Awerbuch’s synchronizers, except that
TLC tolerates a threshold number of faulty nodes that may
be unavailable and/or compromised.
The contract TLC offers upper-layer protocols on par-
ticipating nodesmay be summarized concisely as follows:
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• I, TLC, will give you, the upper-layer protocol, an
integer clock thatmeasures time, by counting rounds
of communication that network connectivity permits
among the group members while tolerating a thresh-
old number of unreachable and/or malicious nodes.
• I will pace your communication with the group by
notifying you when logical time advances, which is
when you may broadcast your next message.
• For reference in formulating your next broadcast, I
will make available a record of history, which will
contain a potentially incomplete subset of the mes-
sages that all nodes broadcast in recent time steps.
• This record of history will tell you not just what you
saw in recent time steps, but also exactly what prior
messages other nodes had seen by the moment of
each recorded event in the history.
• I will ensure that the recorded history includes mes-
sages from at least a threshold number of nodes at
each past logical time step it records.
• Optional: I will ensure that a threshold number of
messages in each time step were seen by a threshold
number of nodes before that time step completes.
We expand on these rules and explore how TLC imple-
ments them in the sections below.
2.2 Time Advancement in Basic TLC
TLC assumes at the outset that we have a well-defined set
of participating nodes, each of which can send messages
to any other participant and can correctly authenticate
messages received from other participants (e.g., using au-
thenticated TLS [135]). Further, in addition to the number
n of participants and their identities, TLC requires a mes-
sage threshold, tm, as a configuration parameter defining
the number of other participants a node must “hear from”
during one logical time-step before moving on to the next.
For simplicity we will assume that 1 < tm < n.
At any moment in real-world time, TLC assigns each
node a logical time step based on its communication his-
tory so far. Like Lamport clocks [97, 132] but unlike
vector or matrix clocks [66, 105, 132, 141, 165], TLC
Figure 1: Illustration of basic threshold logical clocks
without witnessing. Each node waits to receive a thresh-
old number of messages at each logical time step: 2 of 3
including its own in this example. Darker arrows indicate
messages that enable nodes to progress; the rest arrive too
late to contribute to time advancement.
represents logical time steps as a single monotonically-
increasingly integer s ∈ N with global meaning across
all n participating nodes. Lamport clocks give individual
nodes, or arbitrarily-small groups of nodes, unconstrained
freedom to increment their notion of the current logical
time to reflect events they locally observe, or claim to have
observed. TLC instead constrains nodes so that they must
coordinate with a threshold tm of nodes in order to “earn
the privilege” of creating a new event and incrementing
their notion of the logical time.
At the “beginning of time” when an instance of the TLC
protocol starts, all nodes start at logical time-step s = 0,
and have the right to broadcast to all participants a single
initial message labeled with s = 0. On reaching this and
every subsequent time-step s, each node i then waits to
receive messages labeled step s from at least tm distinct
participants, including i itself. At this point, node i has
earned the right to advance its logical time to step s + 1,
and consequently broadcasts a single message labeled s+
1 before it must wait again.
Node i does not care which set of tm participants it re-
ceived step s messages from in order to meet its thresh-
old and advance to s + 1. Critical to tolerating arbitrary
(adversarial) network scheduling, i simply takes the first
threshold set of messages to arrive, regardless of which
subset of participants they came from, then moves on.
Figure 1 illustrates this process for a single three-node
example with a message threshold tm = 2. This TLC con-
figuration requires each node to collect one other node’s
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step s message in addition to its own before advancing
and broadcasting its step s+ 1 message.
Different nodes may start at different real-world wall-
clock times, and the network may arbitrarily delay or re-
order the delivery of any node’s message to any other.
This implies that different nodesmay reach a given logical
time-step at vastly different wall-clock times than other
nodes.We refer to the varying sets of real-world times that
different nodes arrive at a given logical step s as the time
frontier of step s. Since each node advances its logical
clock monotonically, the time frontier for each successive
step s divides real time into periods “before” and “after”
step s from the perspective of any given node i. A given
moment in real time may of course occur before s from
one node’s perspective but after s for another node.
2.3 Causal Propagation of Messages
To simplify reasoning about logical time and the proto-
cols we wish to build on it, we will assume that any TLC
implementation ensures that knowledge propagates “vi-
rally” according to a causal ordering. For example, sup-
pose nodeA sends message 1A at step 1, nodeB receives
it before moving to step 2 and broadcasting message 2B ,
and node C in turn receives message 2B. In this case,
message 1A is causally before 2B . We will assume that
the underlying network or overlay protocol, or the TLC
implementation itself, ensures that node C learns about
message 1A either before or at the same time as C learns
about 2B: i.e., in causal order.
One way to ensure causal message propagation is con-
ceptually trivial, if impractically inefficient. Each node
i simply includes in every message it sends a record of
i’s entire causal history: e.g., a complete log of every
message i has ever received directly or heard about in-
teractly from other nodes. There are more practical and
efficient ways to ensure causally-ordered message deliv-
ery, of course: Section 9.3, will employ standard gossip
and vector time techniques for this purpose. For now, we
will simply take causally-ordered message propagation
for granted as if it were a feature of the network.
2.4 Viral Advancement of Logical Time
A consequence of the threshold condition for time ad-
vancement, combined with causally-ordered message
propagation, is that not just messages but also time ad-
vancement events propagate virally.
Suppose, for example, that node i is waiting at logical
time-step s while another node j has advanced to a later
step s′ > s arbitrarily far ahead of i. If i receives the
message j broadcast at step s′, then this delivery causes i
to “catch up” instantly to step s′. This is because, due to
causal message propagation, i obtains from j not just j’s
step s′ broadcast but also, indirectly, the tm threshold set
of messages j used to advance from s to s+ 1, those that
j used to advance to s+ 2, etc., up through step s′.
2.5 Information Propagation in TLC
The basic TLC protocol outlined above makes it easy to
reason about the information that flowed into a node lead-
ing up to a particular time step s + 1. Because any node
i had to obtain a threshold tm of step s messages, either
directly or indirectly, in order to advance to s + 1 at all,
this trivially implies that i’s “view” of history at step s+1
will contain at least a tm/n fraction of all messages from
step s, as well as at all prior steps.
To build interesting protocols atop TLC, however, we
will need to be able to reason similarly about informa-
tion flowing out of a particular node into other nodes after
some step s. In particular, after a node i broadcasts its
step s message, how can we tell how many nodes have
received that message by some future logical time, say
s+1? The adversarial network schedule ultimately deter-
mines this, of course, but it would be useful if we could
at least measure after the fact the success (or lack thereof)
of a given message’s propagation to other nodes. For this
purpose, we enhance TLC to supportwitnessed operation.
2.6 Threshold Witnessed TLC
One way we can determine when a message broadcast
by a node has reached other nodes is by requiring the
node to collect delivery confirmations proactively, as a
new prerequisite for the advancement of logical time. We
might, for example, require each node to transmit each of
its broadcasts to every other node and await TCP-like ac-
knowledgments for its broadcast. If we require a node to
confirm message delivery to all other nodes, or even to
any pre-defined set of other nodes, however, this would
present denial-of-service opportunities to the adversarial
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Figure 2: Illustration of one witnessed TLC time-step
from the perspective of one particular node B. Darker
arrows indicate messages on the “critical path” enabling
node B to make progress.
network, which could arbitrarily delay the critical mes-
sage or acknowledgment deliveries.
To tolerate full network asynchrony, we must again in-
voke threshold logic, this time to confirm a message’s de-
livery to any subset of participants meeting some thresh-
old, without caring which specific subset confirms deliv-
ery. Confirming message delivery to a threshold of par-
ticipants is the basic purpose of a threshold witnessing
protocol such as CoSi [155]. Threshold witnessing is use-
ful, for example, in proactively ensuring the public trans-
parency of software updates [68,122] or building scalable
cryptographically-trackable blockchains [90, 92, 93].
Threshold witnessing may be secured against Byzan-
tine behavior using cryptographic multisignature or
threshold signing schemes [15,25,56,58,131,147]. Since
we are assuming no Byzantine nodes for now, however,
simple acknowledgments suffice for the moment in TLC.
We introduce a new witness threshold configuration pa-
rameter tw to TLC. A TLC protocol instance is thus now
parameterized by message threshold tm, witness thresh-
old tw, and total number of nodes n. We will label such
a TLC configuration TLC(tm, tw, n) for brevity. In prac-
tice we will typically pick tw either to be equal to tm, or to
be zero, reducing to unwitnessed TLC as described above.
We separate the message and witness thresholds, however,
because they play orthogonal but complementary roles.
These threshold parameters establish a two-part condi-
tion for a node to advance logical time. To get from step
s to s + 1, each node must collect not just tm messages
but tm threshold witnessed messages from step s. Each
threshold message must have been witnessed by at least
tw participants before it can “count” towards tm.
To create a threshold witnessed message, each node
i first broadcasts its “bare” unwitnessed step s message
m, and begins collecting witness acknowledgments on m
from participants serving as witnesses. Another node j
that receivesm in step s simply replies with an acknowl-
edgment that it has witnessed m. Upon collecting a tw
threshold of witness acknowledgmentswithin step s, node
i broadcasts an assertion that m has been threshold wit-
nessed. Only upon receiving this threshold witness confir-
mation may any node countm towards its message thresh-
old tm required to advance to step s + 1. Figure 2 illus-
trates this process in a simple 3-node configuration.
Suppose a node i broadcasts an unwitnessed message
m for step s, and another node j receives m not in step
s, but after having advanced to a later step s′ > s. In this
case, receiving node j considersm to be “too late” for step
s, and declines to witness m for step s. Instead, j replies
with the information i needs to “catch up” to the most
recent step s′ that j is aware of. If too many nodes receive
i’s messagem too late, this may make it impossible form
ever to be threshold witnessed – but i can still advance its
logical time with the information j provided in lieu of a
witness acknowledgment for step s.
Due to network scheduling, a node i may receive tm
threshold witnessed messages of other nodes, and hence
satisfy the conditions to advance time, before i has ob-
tained a threshold tw of witness acknowledgments to its
own step s message. In this case, i simply abandons its
collection of witness acknowledgments for its own mes-
sage and moves on, using only other nodes’ threshold wit-
nessed messages and not its own as its basis for advancing
time. This rule preserves the property that time advance-
ment advances virally, as discussed above, and ensures
that a lagging node can “catch up” instantly to the rest
upon receiving a message from a recent time-step.
With witnessed TLC, we now have a convenient basis
for reasoning about information flow both into and out of
a node at a given time-step. As before, we know that to
reach step s + 1 any node i must have collected infor-
mation – and hence be “caught up” on the histories of –
at least tm nodes as of step s. With witnessed TLC, we
additionally know by construction that any node’s step s
message that is threshold witnessed by step s+1 has prop-
agated “out” to and been seen by at least tw nodes by s+1.
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Figure 3: Global time periods demarked by the moments
a majority of correct nodes reach a threshold time t.
Finally, because only threshold witnessed messages count
towards the tm threshold to advance time, we know that
by the time any node reaches step s+ 1 there are at least
tm threshold witnessed messages from step s.
2.7 Majoritarian Reasoning with TLC
So far we have developed TLC in terms of arbitrary
thresholds tm and tw without regard to any specific choice
of thresholds. But many interesting protocols, such as
consensus protocols, rely onmajoritarian logic: i.e., that a
participant has received information from, or successfully
delivered information to, a majority of participants.
For this reason, we now explore the important special
case of TLC configured with majority thresholds: i.e.,
tm > n/2 and tw > n/2. To tolerate Byzantine faults,
Section 5 will adjust these thresholds to ensure majori-
ties of correct, non-Byzantine nodes – but the fundamen-
tal principles remain the same.
Configured with majority thresholds, TLC offers two
key useful properties: time period delineation and two-
step broadcast. We develop these properties next.
2.8 Global time period delineation
Even though different TLC nodes reach a given time step
at varying real times, majoritarian TLC nevertheless di-
vides not just logical but also real wall-clock time into
a well-defined quasi-synchronous succession of real time
periods. The start of each global time period may be de-
fined by the moment in real time that a majority of nodes
first reaches a given logical time step s. Figure 3 illus-
trates this principle, with real time delineated into succes-
sive time periods, each starting the moment the first two
of the three nodes have advanced to a given time step.
Because each node’s logical clock advances monotoni-
cally, and a majority of nodes must reach step s before a
majority of nodes can reach s+1, these majoritarian time
periods likewise advance monotonically. These time peri-
ods in principle create the effect of a purely synchronous
“lock-step” system, but with time periods “self-timed” by
the progress of underlying network communication.
Even though these majoritarian time periods are easy to
define in principle, we face a practical challenge in proto-
col design. Without precisely-calibrated real-time clocks,
which we prefer not to assume, an individual node will
rarely be able to tell whether it has advanced to logical
time step s before, or after, other participants. This implies
in turn that no node can realistically be expected to know
or determine precisely when a previous time period ends
and the next begins. In the Figure 3 example, although
globally there is a clear and well-defined “fact of the mat-
ter” regarding the moment each majoritarian time period
begins and ends, a node will be unable to tell whether
it advanced to step s before majoritarian time period s
started (e.g., 1A), after period s started (1C), or happened
to be the “critical moment” that launched period s (1B).
Despite this limitation in the knowledge of any given
node, this majoritarian delineation of real time into peri-
ods gives us important tools for reasoning conservatively
about when any particular message could, or could not,
have been formulated and sent. Consider in particular a
given time period s, starting the moment a majority of
participants reach step s and ending the moment a major-
ity of participants reach s+ 1. We can be sure that:
1. No node can advance to step s+1, or send a message
labeled s + 1, before the prior global time period s
has started. Such a node i would have had to collect
a majority tm of step s messages to meet its condi-
tion to advance logical time, but no majority of step
s messages can be available to i before a majority of
nodes has actually reached step s.
2. After global time period s has ended and s + 1 be-
gun, no node can formulate or successfully threshold
witness any new message for step s. Getting a step s
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message threshold witnessed would require a major-
ity of nodes to provide witness acknowledgments for
step s. But after period s + 1 begins, a majority of
nodes has “moved on” to s+1 and stopped providing
witness acknowledgments for step s, leaving only an
inadequate minority of nodes that could potentially
witness new messages for step s.
Looking at an illustration like Figure 3, one might rea-
sonably ask whether the wandering time frontiers, rep-
resenting each node’s advancement to a given step s,
can “cross” over not only the majoritarian time period
s boundary, but also the time period boundaries before
(s− 1) and/or after (s+ 1). The above two guarantees in
a sense answer this question in the negative, effectively
keeping all nodes approximately synchronized with each
other, plus or minus at most one logical time step.
The first property above trivially ensures that no node
can reach step 2 before global time period 1 has begun,
can reach step 3 before period 2 has begun, etc. Thus,
no node can “race ahead” of the majority’s notion of the
current logical time by more than one time step.
And although communication patterns such as denial-
of-service attacks could cause a particular node to “lag”
many time-steps behind the majority in terms of real time,
the second property above guarantees that such a lagging
node cannot actually produce any effect, observable via
threshold witnessed messages, after period s has ended
and s + 1 begun. Any new messages the lagging node
might produce after period s + 1 has begun will effec-
tively be “censored”, by virtue of being unable ever to be
threshold witnessed. The lagging node will once again be
able to send threshold witnessed messages when, and only
when, it “catches up” to the current global time period.
2.9 Two-step semi-reliable broadcast
Another key property we obtain from majority message
and witness thresholds is a guarantee that a majority of
the messages sent at any time step s will be known to all
participants by step s + 2. TLC thus implicitly provides
two-step broadcast at least for a majority, though not all,
of the messages sent at any time step.
To see why this is the case, consider that in order for
any node to advance to step s+1, it must collect a major-
ity tm of threshold witnessed messages from step s. Each
of these messages must have been seen by a majority tw
of nodes in order to have been successfully threshold wit-
nessed. To reach step s+2, in turn, each node must collect
a majority tm of threshold witnessed messages from step
s + 1. The majority of nodes that witnessed any thresh-
old witnessed messagem from step s must overlap, by at
least one node i, with the majority of nodes that any other
node j collects messages from in order to reach s+2. This
intersection node i effectively serves as a conduit through
which j is guaranteed to learn of message m transitively
through causal knowledge propagation, even if j itself did
not directly witnessm during step s.
Since the real time at which nodes reach step s + 2
is determined by the network’s arbitrary communication
schedule, this two-step broadcast property can make no
guarantees about when in real time any node actually
learns about threshold witnessed message m from step s.
A minority of nodes might lag many time steps behind
the majority, and learn about m only when they even-
tually “catch up” and resynchronize. By the time period
delineation properties above, however, no lagging node
will be able to have any effect on the majority, observable
through threshold witnessed messages, before catching up
with the majority. If the lagging node catches up at step
s+2 or later, it learns about threshold witnessed message
m from step s, through causal propagation, in the process
of catching up.
It is important to keep in mind that this two-step broad-
cast property applies only to the “lucky” majority of mes-
sages that were threshold witnessed in step s, however.
A minority of messages that other participants tried to
send in step s may never be threshold witnessed before
too many nodes advance to s + 1 and the “gate closes”
on step s. These unlucky step s messages might be seen
by some participants, but TLC can make no guarantee
that all, or any particular number, of participants will ever
see them. Further, the adversarial network gets to decide
which messages are in the lucky majority that are thresh-
old witnessed and broadcast, and which are unlucky and
potentially lost to history. Messages that fail to achieve
threshold witnessed status during a time step may be con-
sidered casualties of network asynchrony.
Another subtle but important caveat with two-step
broadcast in TLC is that even if message m is threshold
witnessed in step s and broadcast to all nodes by s+2, this
does not mean that all nodes will know thatm was thresh-
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old witnessed by s + 2. Suppose a node i receives and
acknowledges the bare, unwitnessed version of m during
step s, for example, thereby contributing to the eventual
threshold witnessing of m. Node i might then, however,
advance to steps s+1 and s+2 on the basis of other sets
of threshold witnessed messages not including m, with-
out ever learning thatm was fully threshold witnessed. In
this case, while i has indeed, like all nodes, seen at least a
bare unwitnessed version of m by step s + 2, only some
nodes may know by s+2 thatm was successfully thresh-
old witnessed. This subtlety will become important later
in Section 4.5 as we build consensus protocols atop TLC.
3 Building Basic Services on TLC
Before we tackle asynchronous consensus in Section 4,
we first briefly sketch several classic distributed services
not requiring consensus that are easy and natural to build
using TLC for pacing. While these services may of course
be built without TLC, the threshold logical clock abstrac-
tion makes it simple for such distributed services to oper-
ate atop fully asynchronous networks in self-timed fash-
ion as quickly as network communication permits.
3.1 Network Time Services
Even in asynchronous distributed systems that we do not
wish to be driven by wall-clock time or timeouts, it is still
important in many ways to be able to tell time and interact
properly with the wall clock. We first discuss three ba-
sic time-centric services and how they might benefit from
asynchronous operation atop TLC: clock synchronization,
trusted timestamping, and encrypted time capsules.
3.1.1 Clock Initialization and Synchronization
Time services such as NTP [117, 118], by which net-
worked devices around the world synchronize their
clocks, play a fundamental role in the Internet’s architec-
ture. Without time services, all devices’ real-time clocks
gradually drift, and can become wildly inaccurate after
power or clock failures. Drifting or inaccurate device
clocks can undermine the functioning of real-time sys-
tems [94] and wireless sensor networks [153, 167]. Se-
curity protocols often rely on devices having roughly-
synchronized clocks [54, 158, 159], otherwise becoming
vulnerable to attacks such as the replay of expired cre-
dentials, certificates, or outdated software with known ex-
ploits [122].
While a correct sense of time is critical to the relia-
bility and security of today’s networked devices, numer-
ous weaknesses have been found in traditional time ser-
vices [71, 110–112, 139]. The fact that clients typically
rely entirely on a single NTP time server (e.g., the nearest
found on a list) is itself an inherent single-point-of-failure
weakness. Using GPS as a time source [51, 101], while
ubiquitous and accurate under normal conditions, is less
trustworthy as GPS spoofing proliferates [30,129,137]. A
networked device might achieve a more secure notion of
the time by relying on a group of independent time servers
rather than just one, thereby avoiding any single point of
failure or compromise.
TLC represents a natural substrate atop which to build
such a distributed time service or beacon. One simple
approach is for each each server in a TLC coordination
group to publish a log (or “blockchain”) of current-time
records, one per TLC time-step. Each successive record
indicates the server’s notion of the record’s publication
time, ideally measured from a local high-precision source
such as an atomic clock. Each published record is both
digitally signed by the server, and witness cosigned by
other coordination group members [155], thereby attest-
ing to clients jointly that the server’s notion of time is con-
sistent to some tolerance. Clients may still follow just one
time server at a time as they currently do (e.g., the clos-
est one), but protect themselves from major inaccuracy
or compromise of their time source by verifying the wit-
ness cosignatures as well. We address later in Section 9.3
the important detail of allowing witnesses to validate pro-
posed time records in an asynchronous setting without in-
troducing arbitrary timeouts or tolerance windows.
The precision a distributed time beacon can provide
will naturally depend on factors such as how widely-
distributed the participating servers are and how reliable
and predictable their mutual connectivity is. Building a
distributed time beacon atop TLC offers the potential
key benefit of adapting automatically to group config-
urations and network conditions. A time beacon com-
posed of globally-distributed servers could offer max-
imum independence and diversity, and hence security,
at the cost of limited precision due to the hundreds-of-
9
milliseconds round-trip delays between group members.
Such a widely-distributed service could offer client de-
vices a coarse-grained but highly-secure “backstop” refer-
ence clock ensuring that the device’s clock cannot be off
by minutes or hours even if more-precise time sources are
unavailable or subverted. Another complementary time
beacon running the same TLC-based protocol, but com-
posed of servers colocated in a single city or data center
with a low-latency interconnect, would automatically gen-
erate much more frequent, high-precision time reports,
while still avoiding single points of failure and degrading
gracefully during partial failures or attacks.
3.1.2 Trusted Timestamping and Notarization
A closely-related application is a digital timestamping
service, which not only tells the current time, but also
produces timestamps on demand attesting that some data
known to the client existed at a certain time. Standards
such as the Time-Stamp Protocol [4, 5] allow clients to
request a signed timestamp on cryptographically hashed
data from a trusted timestamping authority. Such an au-
thority is again a single point of failure, however, motivat-
ing recently-popular decentralized approaches to times-
tamping, such as collecting content hashes into a Merkle
tree [115] and embedding its root in a Bitcoin transac-
tion [121, 156], or collectively signing each root [155].
An asynchronous distributed timestamping service,
whose period and timestamp granularity is self-timed
to the best allowed by group configuration and prevail-
ing network conditions, represents a natural extension
to a TLC-based time service. Each server in such a
group might independently collect client-submitted con-
tent hashes into Merkle trees, publishing a signed and wit-
ness cosigned tree each TLC time step, as in the CoSi time
service [155, Section V.A]. In addition, a newly-started or
long-offline device can bootstrap its internal clock with
strong freshness protection, preventing an upstream net-
work attacker from back-dating its notion of time, by ini-
tializing its clock according to a witness cosigned times-
tamp it requests on a freshly-generated random nonce.
3.1.3 Encrypted Time Capsules
A third classic time-related service with many potential
uses is a cryptographic time vault or time capsule, al-
lowing clients to encrypt data so that it will become de-
cryptable at a designated future time. In games, auctions,
and many other market systems, for example, partici-
pants often wish to encrypt their moves or bids from oth-
ers until a designated closing time to guard against front
running [50, 61]. Time-lock puzzles [136] and verifiable
delay functions [24, 162] represent purely cryptographic
proposals to achieve this goal, but cryptographic ap-
proaches face inherent challenges in accurately estimating
the future evolution of, and market investment in, compu-
tational and cryptanalytic puzzle-solving power [45,108].
Another approach to time capsules more compatible
with TLC relies on a time service that holds a master key
for identity-based encryption (IBE) [26,146,160].Clients
encrypt their messages to a virtual “identity” represent-
ing a particular future time. The time service regularly
generates and publishes the IBE private keys represent-
ing these “time identities” as they pass, allowing anyone
to decrypt any time-locked ciphertext after the designated
time passes. Threshold secret-sharing [144, 145, 152] the
IBE master key among the group avoids single points of
failure or compromise. The asynchronous setting presents
the challenge that clients seemingly must predict the fu-
ture rate at which the time capsule service will operate,
and hence the granularity at which it will publish time-
identity keys, a detail we address later in Section 9.3.
3.2 Public Randomness Beacons
Like time, trustworthy public randomness has become an
essential “utility” needed by numerous applications. Lot-
teries and games need random choices that all participants
can trust to be fair and unbiased, despite the many times
such trust has been breached in the past [64,69,149,161].
Governments need public randomness to choose a sample
of ballots to select jury candidates [138], to audit election
results [35,104], and experimentally, to involve citizens in
policy deliberation through sortition [57, 67]. Large-scale
decentralized systems such as blockchains need public
randomness to “scale out” via sharding [93, 106].
The many uses for public randomness have inspired
beacons such as NIST’s [89]. Concerns about centralized
beacons being a single point of compromise [151], how-
ever, again motivate more decentralized approaches to
public randomness [27,33,42,100,154].Threshold-secure
approaches [33,96,154] are naturally suited to being built
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on TLC, which can pace the beacon to produce fresh ran-
dom outputs dynamically as often as network connectivity
permits, rather than at a fixed period.
4 Que Sera Consensus (QSC)
We now explore approaches to build consensus protocols
atop TLC, using a series of strawman examples to address
the key challenges in a step-by-step fashion for clarity.
This series of refinements will lead us to QSC3, a ran-
domized non-Byzantine (i.e., Paxos-equivalent) consen-
sus protocol. We leave Byzantine consensus to Section 5.
Although the final QSC3 protocol this section arrives at
is quite simple, the reasoning required to understand and
justify it subtle, as with any consensus protocol. A desire
to clarify this reasoning motivates our extended, step-by-
step exposition. Expert readers may feel free to skip to the
final solution summarized in Section 4.10 if desired.
4.1 Strawman 0: multiple possible histories
As a starting point, we will not even try to achieve con-
sensus reliably on a single common history, but instead
simply allow each node to define and build its own idea
of a possible history, independently of all other nodes.
For convenience and familiarity, we will represent each
node’s possible history as a blockchain, or tamper-evident
log [49, 143] in the form popularized by Bitcoin [121].
At TLC time-step 0, we assume all N nodes start
building from a common genesis block that was some-
how agreed uponmanually. At each subsequent time-step,
each node independently formulates and proposes a new
block, which contains a cryptographic hash or back-link
to the previous block. Thus, node i’s block 1 contains a
hash of the genesis block, node i’s block 2 contains a hash
of node i’s block 1, and so on. The main useful property
of this structure is that the blockchain’s entire history is
identified and committed by knowledge of the head, or
most recent block added. It is cryptographically infeasi-
ble to modify any part of history without scrambling all
the hash-links in all subsequent blocks including the head,
thereby making any modification readily detectable.
Figure 4 illustrates three nodes building three indepen-
dent blockchains in this way. The real (wall-clock) time
at which each node reaches a given TLC time-step and
Figure 4: Illustration of Strawman 0: each of theN nodes
independently builds its own possible history, each repre-
sented by a blockchain with one block per TLC time-step.
proposes the corresponding block on its blockchain may
vary widely across nodes due to network delays, but TLC
serves to pace all nodes’ advancement of time and keep
them logically in lock-step despite these delays.
If we assume each node’s proposed block at a given
time-step contains a set of transactions submitted by
clients, as in Bitcoin, then even this strawman protocol
can provide a limited notion of “consensus.” If a client
submits some transaction T to all N nodes (e.g., “Alice
pays Bob 1 BTC”), and the client succeeds in getting T
embedded in each node’s history, then the client can con-
sider T to be “committed.” This is because regardless of
which of the N posssible histories we might choose to
believe, all of them contain and account for transaction T .
However, if a “double-spending” client manages to get
T onto some nodes’ blockchains and gets a conflicting
transaction T ′ 6= T onto others (e.g., Alice pays Char-
lie the same 1 BTC), then we will forever be uncertain
whether Bob or Charlie now holds the 1 BTC and un-
able ever to resolve the situation. Thus, we need a way to
break the symmetry and enable some competing histories
to “win” and others “lose” – the challenge we tackle next.
4.2 Strawman 1: genetic consensus
Introducing randomness makes it surprisingly simple to
create a working, if non-ideal, consensus protocol. Sup-
pose we modify the above strawman such that at each
time-step, one randomly-chosen node chooses to adopt
and build on the blockchain of a randomly-chosen neigh-
bor instead of its own. This node’s prior history is thus
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Figure 5: Illustration of Strawman 1, in which each of the
N nodes occasionally choose to adopt a random neigh-
bor’s blockchain in favor of their own, as if one history
“genome” had “died” while another “reproduced.”
dropped from the space of possibilities, and effectively
replaced with the node’s newly-adopted view of history.
Consider the simple example in Figure 5. At TLC step
1, each node independently builds on the genesis block
as before. At step 2, however, node A randomly chooses
to build on B’s prior blockchain instead of its own. Simi-
larly, at step 3, node C chooses to adopt B’s blockchain.
While we still have three competing heads and hence
competing histories (namely 3A, 3B, and 3C ), neverthe-
less they happen to share a common prefix, namely block
1B . Because all future time-steps must build on one of
these three possible histories, all sharing this common
prefix, we can consider the common prefix (block 1B) to
be committed – even if we can’t (yet) say anything about
the more recent blocks. This situation is directly analo-
gous to the common event of a temporary fork in Bitcoin,
where two miners mine competing blocks at about the
same time, deferring resolution of the conflit for later. The
main difference is that we pace the “mining” of blocks in
our protocol using TLC instead of via proof-of-work.
Whenever one node adopts another’s blockchain, any
transactions that had existed only in the node’s prior
blockchain become lost or in effect “aborted.” All transac-
tions on the adopted blockchain, in contrast, becomemore
likely to survive long-term because they are represented
redundantly in the (new) history of one additional node,
and become correspondinglymore likely to propagate fur-
ther via future adoption events. If we ever happen to ob-
serve that through this random history-adoption process,
a particular transaction of interest has propagated to allN
nodes’ view of history, then we can consider that transac-
tion to be definitely “committed.” But will every transac-
tion reach such a state of being definitely either “commit-
ted” (by virtue of being on all nodes’ views of history) or
“aborted” (by virtue of being on none of them)?
Given time, the answer is definitely yes. This is because
from the perspective of a particular transaction that any
node first introduces in a block on its local blockchain,
that transaction’s subsequent propagation or elimination
corresponds to a Moran process [119, 123], a statistical
process designed to model genetic drift in a population
constrained to a fixed size (e.g., by natural resource lim-
its). A node’s adoption of another’s blockchain corre-
sponds to the successful “reproduction” of the adopted
blockchain, coincident with the “death” of the replaced
blockchain. We might view all the transactions in the
adopted blockchain’s view of history to be the “genome”
of the successfully-reproducing blockchain, whose con-
stituent blocks and transactions become more likely to
survive with each successful reproduction.
This process is a variation on the Po´lya urn model [86,
109, 128], where we view each competing blockchain (or
the transactions on them) as colored balls in an urn. From
this perspective, we view one node’s adoption of another’s
blockchain as the removal of a pair of colored balls from
the urn, where we duplicate one, discard the other, and re-
turn the two duplicates to the urn. With time, this process
guarantees that any particular transaction in any particular
blockchain’s “genome” is eventually either lost (aborted)
or propagated to all other individuals (committed). If all
nodes’ blockchains have the same “genetic fitness” or
likeliness to reproduce, then a transaction first introduced
in a block on any one node has a uniform probability of
1/N of eventually being “committed” this way.
Of course, this strawman has several obvious limita-
tions. 1/N is not a great probability of a proposed trans-
action being successfully committed.We must wait a con-
siderable time before we can know a transaction’s com-
mit/abort status for certain. And we must monitor all
nodes’ blockchains – not just a threshold number of them
– in order to reach absolute certainty of this commit/abort
status. However, this strawman does illustrate how simple
it can be in principle to achieve some notion of “consen-
sus” through a simple random process.
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4.3 Strawman 2: a genetic fitness lottery
We can speed up the above “genetic process” in two ways,
which we do now. First, we can simply increase the global
rate of death and reproduction, by requiring several – even
all – nodes to replace their history at each time-step with
a randomly-chosen node’s prior history. TLC’s lock-step
notion of logical time facilitates this process. At each step
s each node proposes and announces a new block, then
at s + 1 each node chooses any node’s step s block at
random to build on in its step s+1’s proposal. Thus, each
node’s proposal will survive even just one round only if
some node (any node) happens to choose it to build on.
The second, more powerful way we can accelerate the
process – and even achieve “near-instant” genetic consen-
sus – is by using randomness also to break the symme-
try of each proposal’s “genetic fitness” or likeliness to re-
produce. At each TLC time-step s, each node announces
not only its newly-proposed block, but also chooses and
attaches to its proposal a random numeric lottery ticket,
which will represent the proposal’s “genetic fitness” rel-
ative to others. These lottery tickets may be chosen from
essentially any distribution, provided all nodes correctly
choose them at random from the same distribution: e.g.,
real numbers between 0 and 1 will work fine.
By TLC’s progress rules, each node must have col-
lected a threshold number of proposals from step s as its
condition to progress to step s + 1. Instead of picking an
arbitrary one of these proposals to build on in the next
consensus round starting at s + 1, each node i must now
choose the step s proposal with the highest-numbered lot-
tery ticket that i knows about: i.e., the most “genetically
fit” or “attractive” proposal it sees. Step s proposals with
higher fitness will be much more likely to “survive” and
be built upon in subsequent rounds, while proposals with
lower fitness usually disappear immediately because no
one chooses to build on them in subsequent rounds.
Figure 6 illustrates this process. At step 2, all three
nodes see and thus choose node B’s “maximally fit” pro-
posal from step 1 to adopt and build on, thereby achieving
instant commitment globally. At step 3, however, nodes
B and C choose the second-most-fit proposal by B, be-
cause A’s globally-winning proposal was unfortunately
not among those that B or C collected in progressing to
TLC step 3. With global knowledge, at step 3 we can be
certain that all transactions up through block 1B are com-
Figure 6: Illustration of Strawman 2, in which each node’s
proposal at each time step includes a random genetic fit-
ness. At the next step, each node chooses the most “fit”
proposal from the previous step to build on.
mitted, but we remain uncertain whether blocks 2A or 2B
will eventually win since both still survive at step 3.
If all nodes correctly follow this process, then we re-
duce the number of possible blockchains effectively sur-
viving and emerging from any time period from n down to
f +1. This is because when any node i reaches step s+1,
there are at most f proposals it might have missed seeing
upon meeting the threshold condition to reach s+ 1, and
hence at most f proposals might have had a better fitness
than the best proposal i saw and picked. While reducing
the possibility space from n possible histories to f + 1
represents an improvement, it is still far from our goal of
course – but we are moving in the right direction.
4.4 Strawman 3: a contest of celebrities
While we have accelerated genetic consensus and re-
duced the number of possible histories that can survive
at each step, we still face the problem that no one can
be certain whether consensus has actually been achieved
without seeing all nodes’ choices at each time-step. If
any node, or one of their clients, tried to collect this in-
formation globally, it might hang waiting to hear from
one last long-delayed or failed node, defeating the high-
availability goal of threshold coordination. It thus appears
we can never discern consensus with certainty.
In Figure 6, for example, node B may be unable to dis-
tinguish between the “consensus” situation at step 2 and
the “lack of consensus” situation at step 3, if B has seen
only C’s step 2 decision and not A’s upon reaching step
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3.B cannot just wait to hear fromA as well without com-
promising availability, but B also cannot exclude the risk
that a higher-fitness “minority opinion” such as block 2A
might exist and eventually win over those B knew about.
This “minority report” problem suggests an appealing
solution: let us restrict the genetic competition at each step
only to celebrity proposals, or those that a majority of
nodes have heard of by the next time-step when it is time
to pick winners. By having each node choose the most
fit only among celebrity proposals, we hope to prevent an
unknown, high-fitness, “dark horse” from later “spoiling”
what might appear to be consensus. This attempt will fail,
but in a useful way that moves us toward a solution.
TLC’s threshold witnessing process in each round con-
veniently provides information useful to identify celebrity
proposals. We will say that participant i confirms pro-
posal p as a celebrity proposal if p was among the set of
threshold-witnessed messages i used to advance its logi-
cal clock to step s + 1. Since each participant must col-
lect a threshold number of threshold-witnessed messages
from step s in order to transition to step s+ 1, each node
automatically confirms a majority of proposals by s+ 1.
We now require that each participant choose its best
confirmed proposal, having the highest-numbered lottery
ticket, as its “preferred” step s proposal to build on at step
s+1. Step s proposals not in node i’s threshold witnessed
set – i.e., the at most f proposals that i did not wait to be
confirmed before i moved to s + 1 – are thus not eligible
from i’s perspective to build on at s+ 1.
With this added rule, each proposal from step s that
survives to be built on at s + 1, is, by protocol construc-
tion, a proposal that most of the participants (all but at
most f ) have seen by step s + 1. Intuitively, this should
increase the chance that “most” nodes at s+1 will choose
and build on the same “lottery winner” from step s. This
rule still leaves uncertainty, however, since different par-
ticipants might have seen different subsets of confirmed
proposals from step s, and not all of themmight have seen
the eligible proposal with the globally winning ticket.
4.5 Strawman 4: seeking universal celebrity
To address this lingering challenge, it would seem useful
if we could be certain that not just a majority of nodes, but
all nodes, know about any proposal we might see as a can-
didate for achieving consensus. Further refining the above
Figure 7: Illustration of Strawman 4, in which knowledge
of winning proposal 1A propagates to all nodes in two
steps after being threshold witnessed by step s+ 1.
celebrity approach, in fact, we can ensure that celebrity
proposals known to a majority of nodes reach universal
celebrity status – becoming universally known to all par-
ticipants – simply by “biding our time” for a second TLC
time-step during each consensus round.
Recall from Section 2.9 that with majority thresholds,
any message m that is broadcast at time-step s and is
threshold-witnessed by step s+1will have propagated to
all nodes by step s+2. This is because the set S of nodes
that witnessedm by step s+1must overlap by at least one
node with the set S′ of nodes whose step s+ 1 messages
any node must collect in order to reach step s+ 2.
Motivated by this observation, we nowmodify the con-
sensus process so that each round requires two TLC time-
steps instead of one. That is, each consensus round r will
start at step s = 2r, and will finish at step s+2, the same
logical time that consensus round r + 1 starts.
At step s, each node proposes a block as before, but
waits until step s+2 to choose a step s proposal to build on
in the next consensus round. Because the universal broad-
cast property above holds only for messages that were
witnessed by a majority of nodes by step s + 1, we must
still restrict each node’s choice of proposals at step s+ 2
to those that had achievedmajority celebrity status by step
s+1. Among these, each node as usual chooses the eligi-
ble proposal from step s with the highest lottery ticket.
By slowing down consensus, we ensure the promising
property that whichever step s proposal p a node might
14
Figure 8: Illustration of Strawman 4’s failure mode, where
knowledge of proposal 1A propagates to all nodes by s+2
but only node A learns that 1A was threshold witnessed.
choose for the next round at s+ 2, all nodes know about
proposal p by step s + 2. Figure 7 illustrates this process
in a scenario in whichA’s proposal at step s+0 is thresh-
old witnessed by nodes {A,B} by step s + 1 to achieve
celebrity status, then as a result propagates to all nodes
{A,B,C} by s+ 2.
Are we done? Unfortunately not. As discussed earlier
in Section 2.9, the fact that all nodes know the existence
of p by step s+2 does not imply that all nodes will know
the crucial fact that p was threshold witnessed, or thus
have confirmed p as having celebrity status by s+ 1.
Due to message timing, different nodesmay reach steps
s + 1 and s + 2 on the basis of different subsets of
threshold-witnessed messages. For example, one node i
might see that proposal p was threshold-witnessed by step
s+1, and eventually choose it as the best eligible proposal
by s+2. Another node j, in contrast, might have reached
step s + 1 on the basis of a different set of witnessed
messages than i used. If proposal p isn’t in j’s threshold-
witnessed set by s + 1, j cannot “wait around” to see if
p eventually becomes fully threshold-witnessed without
compromising j’s availability, so j must move on.
In this case, j will definitely learn the existence of pro-
posal p by step s + 2, from at least one of the majority
set of nodes that witnessed p by s + 1. But this fact tells
j only that at least one node witnessed p, not that a ma-
jority of nodes witnessed p by s + 1, as required for j
to confirm p as eligible for the next round to build on. In
this situation, nodes i and j may pick different eligible
proposals to build on in the next round, and neither i nor
j has any readily-apparent way to distinguish this con-
Figure 9: Illustration of Strawman 5, in which paparazzi
node B confirms proposal 0A at s + 1, then gossips its
confirmation to {B,C} by s+2 and to all nodes by s+3.
sensus failure situation from one in which all nodes fortu-
itously do choose the same best eligible proposal. Figure 8
illustrates such a failure case, where the globally best pro-
posal 1A is threshold witnessed by s+ 1 but only nodeA
actually learns by then that proposal 1A is eligible.
4.6 Strawman 5: enter the paparazzi
Is there some way a node can tell not only that a proposal
p has reached celebrity status by s + 1 and thus that p’s
existence will be known to all nodes by s+2, but addition-
ally that the fact of p’s celebrity status will also become
known to all nodes? We can, by a second application of
the same two-step broadcast principle, merely shifted one
time-step later. Suppose a node j confirms p’s celebrity
status at step s + 1, then successfully “gossips” that fact
to a majority of nodes by s + 2. Then not only the exis-
tence of p but also j’s confirmation of p’s celebrity status
will subsequently become known to all nodes by s+ 3.
We therefore extend each consensus round to take three
TLC time-steps, so that round r starts at step s = 3r and
ends at s + 3. In addition, we will try to strengthen the
eligibility criteria for proposals to ensure that both the ex-
istence and the celebrity status of any chosen proposal be-
comes known to all nodes by s+ 3. In particular, for any
node i to consider a proposal p broadcast at s to be eli-
gible for the consensus round’s genetic lottery, i must see
that: (a) some node j, who we’ll call the paparazzi, ob-
served and reported p’s celebrity status in j’s broadcast at
step s+ 1; and (b) that j’s broadcast at s+ 1 was in turn
threshold witnessed by a majority of nodes by step s+ 2.
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For brevity, we will say that the paparazzi node j first
confirms proposal p’s celebrity status at step s+ 1, then i
in turn confirms j’s step s+ 1 broadcast in the same way.
When such a “double-confirmation” linked by paparazzi
node j occurs, we say that node i reconfirms proposal p.
Node j’s confirmation of p at s+ 1 ensures that all nodes
will know the existence of p by s+ 2, and i’s reconfirma-
tion of p at s+ 2 in turn ensures that all nodes will know
of j’s confirmation of p by s+ 3. Figure 9 illustrates this
process, with nodeB acting as paparazzi forA’s proposal
0A in an example 3-step consensus round.
Are we done yet? Unfortunately we’ve merely kicked
the can down the road. If node i reconfirms p by step s+2,
this implies that all nodes will know by s + 3 that p was
confirmed, but it does not imply that other nodes will have
reconfirmed p. If reconfirmation and not just confirmation
is p’s new eligibility condition, then we must account for
the fact that we have moved the goalposts. By the end
of the round at s + 3, different nodes may still disagree
on whether p was reconfirmed and hence (still) eligible
for the genetic lottery, once again allowing disagreement
about the consensus round’s result in the end.
We could try playing the status gossip and confirmation
game yet again, making triple-confirmation the proposal
eligibility condition, but this approach just leads us in cir-
cles. A proposal’s triple-confirmed status will ensure that
all nodes know by s + 4 that it was double-confirmed,
but will still leave disagreement on whether it was triple-
confirmed. We must therefore try something else: it is
hard to win a game of counting to infinity.
4.7 Strawman 6: gazing into the crystal ball
Since we would appear to need an infinite amount of time
to get “complete” information about a consensus round,
let us instead make the best we can of incomplete informa-
tion. We will therefore return to using only (single) con-
firmation as the eligibility criterion for a proposal to enter
the genetic lottery. We will then use (double) reconfirma-
tion to give us an unreliable “crystal ball” that sometimes
– when we’re lucky – enables some nodes to predict when
all other nodes will just happen to converge and agree on
the same “best eligible proposal” during the round.
Our crystal ball will sometimes be clear, allowing a pre-
cise prediction, and sometimes cloudy, offering no use-
ful information. Further, the crystal ball may appear clear
from the perspective of some nodes, and cloudy to others,
even in the same consensus round. The crystal ball’s sub-
jective fickleness may therefore leave only some nodes
aware when consensus succeeds, while other nodes must
wait until future rounds to learn this fact in retrospect.
Since all nodes are again using (single) confirmation
as their criterion for a proposal p’s eligibility, this im-
plies that no node will choose p in this round unless at
least the existence of proposal p (though not necessarily
its celebrity status) has become known to all nodes by
step s+ 2. Now suppose that some node i happens to no-
tice that p is not just confirmed but is in fact reconfirmed
(double-confirmed) by step s+2. This does not tell i that
other nodes will also reconfirm p, but it does tell i that all
other nodes will have at least (singly) confirmed p by step
s + 3. Thus, node i knows – even if other nodes don’t –
that all nodes will realize by s+ 3 that p is eligible.
Finally, suppose that by step s + 3, node i is also not
aware of the existence of any other proposal p′, confirmed
or not, having a lottery ticket competitive with that of p
(i.e., a value greater than or equal to p’s ticket). Since any
such competitive proposal p′ cannot become eligible, or
be confirmed by any node, without at least p′’s existence
becoming known to all nodes by s + 2, the fact that i
has not seen any sign of a competitive proposal implies
that there can be no eligible competitor to p. There could
be proposal p′ with a competitive ticket value that i didn’t
see, but to be “hidden” from i in this fashion, p′ must have
been seen by only a minority of nodes, and thus cannot be
eligible and cannot have been confirmed by anyone.
Since i now knows from p’s reconfirmation that all
nodes will know and have confirmed p by s + 3, and no
other eligible proposal competitive with p exists that any
node could confirm to spoil p’s victory, this means that
i has successfully “gazed into the crystal ball” and pre-
dicted this round’s inevitable convergence on p. Node i
can predict with certainty that all nodes will choose p as
their best eligible proposal to build in the next round, even
though these other nodes themselves may not be aware
of this convergence. Since all future histories must now
build on p, i can consider all transactions in p and all prior
blocks that p built on to be permanently committed.
Since other nodes may not obtain the same information
as i in this round, other nodes may see the crystal ball as
cloudy, and be forced to assume conservatively that con-
sensus may have failed, and that different nodes might
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pick different best eligible proposals. These other nodes
will eventually learn, in some future round in which they
successfully use the crystal ball, that p has been commit-
ted as a prefix to some longer history that has by then been
built atop proposal p. The fact that only some nodes (or
even no nodes) might actually know in this round that all
nodes have converged on p does not change the inevitably
– or “fate” – that all future history will build on p.
Some consensus rounds may also genuinely fail to con-
verge, in which case different nodes see and choose dif-
ferent proposals as the best eligible. In this case, all nodes
will perceive the crystal ball as cloudy. Some nodes might
fail to discern the eligibility status of the best (glob-
ally) eligible proposal, instead seeing that proposal as a
“spoiler” competitive with some next-best proposal that
they do confirm as eligible. Other nodesmight confirm the
best proposal as eligible, but fail to reconfirm it because
knowledge of the proposal’s eligibility failed to propagate
to a majority of nodes, making the proposal’s reconfir-
mation impossible. In any case, any consensus round that
fails to converge can still safely yield multiple “compet-
ing” proposals, as in earlier cases above, to be left for res-
olution by a more-fortunate future consensus round.
4.8 Something wicked this way routes
Having resigned ourselves to the possibility that only
some consensus rounds may succeed, and that only some
nodes may even realize that a round succeeded, we would
like to know whether and how often we can actually an-
ticipate this desirable outcome. If the network is truly ad-
versarial, however, choosing message delays and delivery
orders intelligently to prevent consensus from succeeding,
for example, then we still appear to have a problem.
If the adversary can see the lottery ticket for each pro-
posal p as soon as p is broadcast at a consensus round’s
start time s+0, the adversary can arrange message deliv-
ery order so that no consensus round ever succeeds. For
example, the adversary can first collect all proposals from
step s along with their lottery tickets, then arrange for
the proposals with the three highest-valued lottery tick-
ets each to be witnessed by only a third of the n nodes
each, ensuring that none of these proposals propagate to a
majority of nodes by step s + 1 to become eligible. Any
other proposal that any node might confirm as eligible
will always be “spoiled” by one of the best three (always-
ineligible) proposals, preventing convergence and keep-
ing all nodes’ crystal balls permanently cloudy.
We could just assume that the network schedules mes-
sage deliveries arbitrarily but obliviously to the values
computed and used in distributed protocols, as in obliv-
ious scheduler models [8, 9, 11, 12, 70]. In today’s open
Internet, however, the threat of intelligent disruption from
network adversaries is unfortunately all too realistic.
Fortunately, we have a conceptually simple way to en-
sure that the adversary cannot interfere with consensus in
this fashion. We simply ensure that the adversary cannot
know the lottery tickets associated with each proposal un-
til later, after the consensus round has completed and the
adversary has already “committed” its decisions on net-
work delays and ordering. In effect, if we force the net-
work adversary to “play its hand” first, by forwarding
enough messages to allow the consensus round to com-
plete before the adversary can learn any lottery ticket val-
ues, then we can ensure by design that the adversary’s de-
cisions are independent of the lottery tickets – exactly as
if network ordering was arbitrary but oblivious.
How can we ensure that an adversarial network does
not learn the proposals’ lottery ticket values before the
consensus round completes? In the present non-Byzantine
case in which we assume all nodes are correct, we can rely
on them not to leak information to the network adversary
directly. We therefore need only to ensure that ticket val-
ues do not leak to the network adversary while in transit
over the network, which we can accomplish simply by en-
crypting the lottery ticket values – or better yet in practice,
all inter-node communication – using a standard pairwise
encryption protocol such as TLS [135]. This approach ob-
viously fails as soon as there is even one Byzantine node
that might leak the lottery ticket values to the adversary;
we address this problem later in Section 5 using Shamir
secret sharing [144,145,152]. For now, however, we sim-
ply assume that the lottery ticket values are kept out of
the adversary’s knowledge “somehow” until the consen-
sus round is over, so that we can assume that they are in-
dependent of network delays and ordering considerations.
4.9 Calculating the odds of success
Given that lottery ticket values are independent of net-
work scheduling, we can now analyze the probability that
any particular node i will “get lucky” and observe a con-
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sensus round to succeed. This occurs only when all nodes
converge on the same proposal p, and node i in partic-
ular is able to detect this convergence by reconfirming
(double-confirming) proposal p. We focus this analysis
purely on what a particular node i observes, because we
merely want to ensure that each node observes success
“often enough” regardless of any other node’s experience.
For simplicity, we will conservatively focus our anal-
ysis on the event that i observes the globally highest-
numbered proposal p to commit. This situation is suffi-
cient, but not necessary, for i to observe success. Network
scheduling could cause all nodes to converge on a pro-
posal other than the global best, and cause i to witness this
as successful commitment, if any other higher-numbered
proposals do not become eligible and fail to arrive at i to
“spoil” its view. But this (likely rare) event can only im-
prove i’s observed success rate, so we ignore it and focus
only on commitments of the globally-best proposal.
Recall the two key conditions above for i to see in its
“crystal ball” that proposal p has been committed: (a) that
i has reconfirmed p, and (b) that i has seen no other pro-
posal p′ from step s, confirmed or not, with a lottery ticket
value competitivewith p’s. By our assumption that p is the
globally-best proposal, (b) cannot happen since no pro-
posal globally better than p exists. We also assume here
that lottery tickets have enough entropy that the chance of
a tie is negligible, but accounting for ties of known prob-
ability requires only a minor adjustment to the analysis.
We therefore care only about the probability that i re-
confirms p: i.e., that some paparazzi node j confirms p
at step s + 1 and i subsequently confirms j’s step s + 1
confirmation of p. Recall that i had to collect threshold-
witnessed messages from amajority of nodes to reach step
s + 2. If any one of these nodes j has confirmed p by
s + 1, then i will subsequently confirm j’s confirmation
and hence reconfirm p. The probability that at least one
of these potential paparazzi confirms p is no less than the
probability that any particular one does, so we can again
focus conservatively on some particular node j.
Node j, in turn, had to collect threshold-witnessed pro-
posals from a majority of nodes in order to reach step
s+ 1. If any one of these proposals is the proposal p with
the globally highest ticket, then j will certainly confirm
p at s + 1. Since each of the n nodes’ proposals have a
1/n chance of being the globally highest, and this is un-
predictable to the network adversary, the chance of node i
observing any given round to succeed is at least 1/2.
Although the probabilities that different nodes in the
same round observe success are interdependent in com-
plex ways, the probabilities of observing success across
successive rounds is independent because each round uses
fresh lottery tickets. The success rate any node observes
therefore follows the binomial distribution across multi-
ple rounds. The probability that a node fails to observe a
successful commitment in k consecutive time steps is less
than 1/2k, diminishing exponentially as k increases.
4.10 Summary: whatever will be, will be
In summary, we have defined a simple randomized con-
sensus protocol atop majority-witnessed TLC. In each
consensus round r starting at TLC time step s = 3r,
each node i simply proposes a block with a random lottery
ticket, waits three TLC time-steps, then uses the commu-
nication history that TLC records and gossips to deter-
mine the round’s outcome from any node’s perspective.
In particular, each node i always chooses a best con-
firmed proposal from round r to build on in the next round
r + 1. Node i confirms a proposal p sent in step s+ 0 if i
can determine that p was threshold-witnessed by a major-
ity of nodes by step s+ 1. A best confirmed proposal for
i is any round r proposal i has confirmed whose lottery
ticket is greater than or equal to that of any other proposal
i has confirmed in this round.
In addition, node i decides that the consensus round has
successfully and permanently committed proposal p if all
of the following three conditions hold:
• Node i obtains a step s + 1 message m, from some
node j, that i can confirm was threshold-witnessed
by a majority of nodes by s+ 2;
• Node j’s messagem at s+ 1 recorded that proposal
p from step s+ 0 was threshold-witnessed by a ma-
jority of nodes by s+ 1; and
• No other step s+0 proposal p′ 6= p that i has become
aware of by step s+2 has a lottery ticket greater than
or equal to that of p.
Each node i will observe successful consensus in this
fashion with an probability of at least 1/2 in each round,
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independently of other rounds. Any round that i sees as
successful permanently commits both proposal p and any
prior uncommitted blocks that p built on. Thus, the prob-
ability i has not yet finalized a unique proposal for round
r by a later round r + k for k ≥ 0 is at most 1/2k.
4.11 Optimizing performance: pipelining
For simplicity we have described QSC with rounds run-
ning sequentially, each round r starting at TLC time-step
3r and ending at step 3r + 3. A simple optimization,
however, is to pipeline QSC consensus rounds so that a
round starts on every time-step and overlaps with other
rounds. With pipelining, each consensus round r starts at
step r and ends at step r + 3. In this way, we can smooth
the communication and computation workload on nodes
at each timestep, minimize the time clients submitting
transactions have to wait for the start of the next con-
sensus round, and reduce the average time clients must
wait for a transaction to commit, since commitment oc-
curs with constant probability for each completed round
and pipelining triples the rate at which rounds complete.
One apparent technical challengewith pipelining is that
at the start of round r + 1 (step r + 1), when each node
broadcasts its proposal, we might expect this proposal
to include a new block in a blockchain. To produce a
blockchain’s tamper-evident log structure [49, 143], how-
ever, each block must contain a cryptographic hash of the
previous block. But the content of the previous block is
not and cannot be known until the prior consensus round
r ends at step r + 3, which due to pipelining is two time-
steps after step r + 1, when we appear to need it!
The solution to this challenge is to produce complete
blocks, including cryptographic back-links, not at the start
of each round but at the end. At the start of round r + 1
(step r + 1), each node broadcasts in its proposal only
the lottery ticket and the semantic content to be included
in this block, e.g., a batch of raw transactions that clients
have asked to commit. Only at the end of round r + 1, at
step r+4, do nodes actually form a complete block based
on this proposal. All nodes, not just the original proposer,
can independently compute the block produced by round
r + 1’s winning proposer, deterministically based on the
content of its step r+1 proposal and the block it builds on
from the previous round r, which we now know because
it was fully determined in step r + 3.
A second-order challenge that this solution creates is
that in transactional systems, the proposer of a block can-
not necessarily know for sure at proposal time that all of
the transactions it is proposing will still be committable
by the completion of the consensus round. For example,
at the start of consensus round r, a node i might propose
a batch of transactions including the payment of a coin
from Alice to Bob. Alice might indeed own the coin to
be spent according to node i’s view of the blockchain at
step r – but by the end of round r, at step r + 3, the coin
might have already been spent in a conflicting transaction
appearing in the blocks i is building on from the rounds
completing at steps r + 1 and r + 2. The deterministic
block-formation function that all nodes run at the end of
each round can account for this risk simply by discarding
such transactions that have become uncommittable by the
time they were proposed, leaving them out of the block
produced at step r + 3 without blaming the block’s pro-
poser for an event it could not have forseen.
5 Tolerating Byzantine Nodes
For simplicity we have assumed so far that only the net-
work, and not the participating nodes themselves, might
exhibit adversarial behavior. Both TLC and QSC may
be extended to tolerate Byzantine behavior using well-
known existing techniques, however, as we outline in this
section. We address this challenge in three main steps,
roughly corresponding to three key layers of functional-
ity from bottom to top: first, enforcing the causal order-
ing that TLC depends on; second, ensuring TLC’s cor-
rect time progress in the presence of Byzantine nodes; and
third, protecting QSC consensus from adversarial nodes.
5.1 Causal Logging and Accountability
While TLC’s goal is to create a “lock-step” notion of log-
ical time, to build TLC and secure it against Byzantine
nodes, it is useful to leverage the classic notion of vec-
tor time [63, 66, 105, 114] and associated techniques such
as tamper-evident logging [49, 143], timeline entangle-
ment [113], and accountable state machines [78, 79].
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5.1.1 Logging and Vector Time
Our approach hinges on transparency and accountability
through logging and verification of all nodes’ state and ac-
tions. Each node maintains a sequential log of every sig-
nificant action it takes, such as broadcasting a message.
Each node’s log also documents the nondeterministic in-
puts, such as messages it received, that led it to take that
action. Each node assigns consecutive sequence numbers
to its log entries. A node’s sequence numbers effectively
serve as a node-local logical clock that simply counts all
the events the node records, independent of both wall-
clock time and other nodes’ sequence numbers.
In addition to logging its own events, each node i also
maintains a mirror copy of all other participating nodes’
logs, and continuously tracks their progress by maintain-
ing a vector containing the highest sequence number i has
seen so far from each other node j. This is the essence of
the classic concept of vector clocks [63, 114].
Because a vector clock indicates only that some node i
has seen all the logged events of some other node j up to
a particular sequence number in j’s local sequence space,
node i must process messages from j, and update its vec-
tor clock accordingly, strictly in the order of j’s sequence
numbers. Suppose i has seen all messages from j up to
sequence number 3, for example, then receives a message
containing j’s event 5 out of order. In this case, i must
hold this out-of-order message in a reordering buffer and
delay its actual processing and internal delivery until i re-
ceives a message from j filling in the missing sequence
number 4. This reordering process is no different from
classic in-order delivery protocols such as TCP [157].
Whenever node i records a new entry in its log, it in-
cludes in the new entry a vector timestamp, which docu-
ments, for the benefit and validation of other nodes, which
messages from all nodes i had seen when it wrote this
entry. This vector timestamp precisely documents all the
nondeterministic information that led i to take the action
this log entry describes. This is also precisely the informa-
tion that other nodes need to “replay” i’s decision logic
and verify that i’s resulting action is consistent with the
protocol that all nodes are supposed to follow, the essen-
tial idea underlying accountable state machines [78, 79].
5.1.2 Exposing Node Misbehavior
To hold nodes accountable, we require each node to
make its log cryptographically tamper-evident according
to standard practices [49, 143]. In particular, each node
chains successive log entries together using cryptographic
hashes as back-links, and digitally signs each complete
log entry including its back-link and vector timestamp.
This construction ensures that nothing in a log’s history
can be modified without changing the back-links in all
subsequent log entries, making the modification evident.
If a node ever misbehaves in a way that is manifestly
identifiable from the contents of its log – e.g., produc-
ing a log entry representing an action inconsistent with
the prescribed protocol applied to the node’s documented
history leading up to that log entry – then the digital signa-
ture on the invalid log entry represents transferable, non-
repudiable “evidence” of the node’s misbehavior. Correct
nodes can gossip this transferable evidence to ensure that
all correct nodes eventually know about the misbehavior
and can respond appropriately, e.g., by alerting operators
and excluding the misbehaving node from the group.
5.1.3 Exposing Equivocation and Forked Histories
Besides producing invalid histories, another way a node
can misbehave is by producing multiple conflicting histo-
ries, each of which might individually appear valid. For
example, a malicious node might produce only one ver-
sion of history up to some particular event, then fork its
log and produce two histories building on that event, pre-
senting one version of its history to some nodes and the
other version of its history to others.
To fork its history, a malicious node must by definition
equivocate at some point by digitally signing two or more
different messages claiming to have the same node-local
sequence number. If the malicious node is colluding with
a powerful network adversary, we cannot guarantee that
correct nodes will immediately – or even “soon” – learn of
this equivocation. The adversarial network could schedule
messages carefully to keep different correct nodes in dis-
joint “regions of ignorance” for an arbitrarily long time,
each region unaware that the other is seeing a different
face of the equivocating node.
Nevertheless, provided the network adversary cannot
partition correct nodes from each other indefinitely, the
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correct nodes will eventually obtain evidence of the equiv-
ocation, by obtaining two different messages signed by
the same node with the same sequence number. These
correctly-signed but conflicting messages again serve as
transferable, non-repudiable evidence of the node’s mis-
behavior, which the correct nodes can gossip and respond
to accordingly. In a general asynchronous setting with no
added assumptions, this eventual detection of equivoca-
tion is the best we can do.
5.1.4 Causal Ordering in Verification Replay
In order for any node i to validate the logged actions of
another node j, i must replay the deterministic logic of
j’s protocol state machine, and compare it against the re-
sulting event that j signed and logged. Since this action
by j likely depended on the messages j had received from
other nodes up to that point, this means that imust use ex-
actly the same views of all other nodes’ histories as j used
at the time of the event, in order to ensure that i is “fairly”
judging j’s actions. If i judges j’s logged event from even
a slightly different “perspective” than that in which j pro-
duced the log entry, then i might might incorrectly come
to believe that j is misbehaving when it is not.
Because the verifier node i’s perspective must line up
exactly with that of the verified node j’s perspective as
of the logged event, this implies first that i must have re-
ceived and saved all the causally prior messages – from
all nodes – that j had seen upon recording its event. This
means that i must process j’s messages, and replay its
state machine, not just in sequential order with respect to
j’s local log, but also in causally consistent order with re-
spect to the vector timestamps in each of j’s log entries.
If one of j’s log entries that i wishes to validate indicates
that j had seen message 3 from another node k, for ex-
ample, but i has not yet received message 3 from node k,
then i must defer its processing and validation of j’s log
entry until i’s own vector clock “catches up” to j’s logged
vector timestamp. Only at this point can i then be sure that
it has k’s message 3 and all others that j’s logged decision
might have been based on.
5.1.5 Handling Equivocation in Log Verification
Equivocation presents a second-order challenge in log
verification, because correct nodes can expect to detect
equivocation only eventually and not immediately. Sup-
pose that correct node i is validating a log entry of another
correct node j, which indicates that j had seen message
3 from a third node k. If k is an equivocating node that
forked its log, then i might have seen a different message
3 from k than the message 3 from k that j saw in record-
ing its logged action. In this way, k might try to “trick”
i into thinking that j misbehaved, when in fact the true
misbehior was not-yet-detected equivocation by k.
Node i must therefore ensure that when validating an-
other node j’s log, i is referring to exactly the same mes-
sages that j had seen, even if these might include equiv-
ocating messages from other nodes like k that have not
yet been exposed as misbehaving. One way to ensure this
property is for j to include in its logged vector times-
tamps not just the sequence numbers of the last message
it received from each other nodes, but also a crypographic
hash of that last message j received from each node. Thus,
a vector timestamp is in general a vector of both sequence
numbers and cryptographic hashes of “log heads”.
If a correct node i obtains such a generalized vec-
tor timestamp from j, representing a set of messages of
other nodes that i “should” have already according to
their sequence numbers, but the cryptographic hash of
k’s last message according to j’s vector timestamp does
not match the message i already has from k with that se-
quence number, then i knows that it must defer judgment
of whether j or k is misbehaving. Node i asks j for copies
of the signed messages from k that j had received and
logged. If any of these are correctly-signed by k but in-
consistent from those i had seen, then i now has evidence
of k’s misbehavior. In addition, i uses the version of k’s
history that j documented, instead of i’s own version of
k’s history, to replay and validate j’s logged actions, to
avoid the risk of incorrectly judging j as misbehaving.
5.2 Byzantine Hardening TLC
None of the above methods above for holding nodes ac-
countable are new, but rather a combination of existing
techniques. These techniques provide all the foundations
we need to make TLC resistant to Byzantine node misbe-
havior, as we explore in more detail now.
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5.2.1 Enforcing correct logical time progress
To protect TLC against Byzantine node behavior, cor-
rect nodes must prevent Byzantine nodes both both ad-
vancing their logical clocks incorrectly, and from tricking
other correct nodes into incorrect behavior. For example,
a Byzantine node might improperly attempt to: advance
its clock faster than it should, before it has received the
threshold of messages required for it to advance; claim
that a message has been threshold witnessed when it has
not; fail to advance its clock when it has received and
logged a threshold of messages; or violate logical clock
monotonicity by “turning back” its clock. This is merely
a sample, not an exhaustive list of potential misbehaviors.
By encoding TLC’s rules into the accountable state ma-
chine logic by which all nodes verify each others’ logs,
however, we can detect most of these misbehaviors au-
tomatically. Haeberlen’s PeerReview framework for ac-
countable state machines [78, 79] lays out all the nec-
essary principles in general, though simplifications and
optimizations are of course possible in specializing this
framework to particular protocols such as TLC and QSC.
In order to advance its clock, for example, any node
must not just claim to have received a threshold of mes-
sages, but must actually exhibit evidence of its claim. This
evidence consists of an appropriate collection of TLC pro-
posal messages from the appropriate time-step, each em-
bedded in the valid and properly-signed logs of a suitable
threshold of distinct participating nodes, all with sequence
numbers causally prior to (“covered by”) the vector clock
with which the node announces its time advancement.
Since all of this evidence lies in messages causally prior to
the time advancement in question, correct nodes will au-
tomatically obtain and verify this body of evidence prior
to processing or verifying the time advancement message
itself. As long as the message threshold tm is larger than
the number of maliciously colluding nodes, therefore, the
colluding nodes cannot advance time without the cooper-
ation of at least one correct node.
The same verification mechanism precludes nodes
from incorrectly claiming a message has been threshold
witnessed, since no correct node will believe such a claim
without seeing the digitally-signed evidence that a thresh-
old of nodes have indeed witnessed the message. Simi-
larly, a malicious node cannot turn back its logical clock
without either equivocating and forking its log, which cor-
rect nodes will eventually detect as discussed above, or
producing a log that self-evidently breaks the monotonic-
ity rule that logical clocks only ever increase, a violation
that correct nodes will immediately detect.
A malicious node can, of course, fail to advance time
when it should by delaying the processing and logging
of messages it in fact received. This behavior is merely
a particular variant of a node maliciously running slowly,
which we fundamentally have no way of distinguishing
from a node innocently running slowly or failing to re-
ceive messages for reasons outside of its control, such as
network delays or DoS attacks attacks. Nevertheless, if a
malicious node does receive and acknowledge in its log
a threshold of suitably-witnessed messages from a given
time step, then itmust advance its logical clock in the next
action it logs, otherwise correct nodes will detect its mis-
behavior. Similarly, if a malicious node is at step s and ac-
knowledges in its log any broadcast received from some
node at a later time step s + δ, then the malicious node
must catch up by advancing its clock immediately to step
s+δ or being caught in non-compliance by correct nodes’
verification logic. In effect, in order to “drag its heels” and
avoid advancing its clock without being caught, a ma-
licious node must entirely stop acknowledging any new
messages from other nodes that would force it to advance
its clock, thereby eventually becoming behaviorally indis-
tinguishable from a node that is merely offline or parti-
tioned from the network for an extended period.
5.2.2 Majoritarian Reasoning in Byzantine TLC
To adapt the majoritarian reasoning tools described ear-
lier in Section 2.7 to a Byzantine environment, we must
adjust the thresholds in much the same way as in existing
Byzantine consensus algorithms [10,20,39,43,44,95]. In
particular, we must set the thresholds to ensure that they
cover a majority of correct nodes after accounting for the
potentially arbitrary behavior of Byzantine nodes.
To define these threshold constraints precisely while
maintaining maximum configuration flexibility, we dis-
tinguish between availability failures, in which a node
follows the prescribed protocol correctly but may go of-
fline or be unable to communicate due to DoS attacks,
and correctness failures, in which a node may be com-
promised by an adversary, leaking its secrets and sending
arbitrary messages to other nodes (including by equivoca-
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tion) in collusion with other compromised nodes and the
network. We assume any TLC configuration is motivated
by some threat model in which there is a particular as-
sumed limit fa ≥ 0 on the maximum number of availabil-
ity (fail-stop) failures, and another assumed limit fc ≥ 0
on the maximum number of correctness (Byzantine) fail-
ures. This decoupling of availability from correctness fail-
ures is closely analogous to that done in UpRight [43].
To apply the majoritarian reasoning from Section 2.7 in
such a Byzantine threat model, the message and witness
thresholds must satisfy the following two constraints:
1. t ≤ n − fa: This constraint ensures that TLC time
can advance, ensuring the system remains live, in the
absence of any communication from up to fa nodes.
2. t > fc+
n−fc
2
(or t > n+fc
2
): This constraint ensures
that the threshold t is large enough to include all of
the fc potentially Byzantine nodes, plus a majority
(strictly greater than half) of the n−fc correct nodes.
Here we use a single threshold t to represent either tm
or tw, which will typically be the same in practice, except
when tw = 0 in the case of unwitnessed TLC.
While we leave the formal definitions and details for
later in Section 10, this majoritarian reasoning works in
TLC (and QSC) for arbitrary nonnegative combinations
of fa and fc. These parameters can in principle represent
separate and independent sets of unavailable and Byzan-
tine nodes, respectively, which may or may not overlap.
That is, TLC can tolerate fa correct but unreachable nodes
and an additional fc responsive but malicious nodes.
If we assume just one set of f generic “faulty” nodes,
each of which might be unresponsive and/or malicious
(i.e., f = fa = fc), and we set t = n− f , then the above
constraints reduce to the classic n > 3f (or equivalently
n ≥ 3f + 1) commonly assumed by Byzantine consen-
sus algorithms. But this represents only one possible and
sensible configuration of TLC’s thresholds.
If we set fc = 0, then the above constraints reduce to
the basic fail-stop model as we assumed in Section 2.7,
where a “simple majority” threshold t > n
2
is adequate.
But arbitrary intermediate values of fc are possible
and interesting as well. Suppose, for example, we set
up a classic BFT-style group of n nodes where initially
fa = fc = f and n > 3f = 2fa + fc. If during the
group’s operation, a malicious node is actually exposed
as malicious by triggering the accountability mechanisms
discussed above, then one reasonable automated response
may be to expell it from the group. Doing so reduces
both n, fc, and t by 1, while leaving fa unaffected since
correct-but-slow nodes aren’t expelled. In the limit case
where all fc malicious nodes eventually expose them-
selves, the group gradually reconfigures itself from a clas-
sic BFT configuration (n > 3f = 2fa + fc) into a classic
Paxos-like fail-stop configuration (n > 2f = 2fa).
TLC also does not inherently assume or require that
correct nodes outnumber Byzantine nodes: that is, n− fc
may potentially be less than fc.
1 In the limit case where
fa = 0, the above constraints reduce to n > fc, the
anytrust model [163]. In such a configuration, liveness
and progress require all n nodes to participate, tolerating
no unavailability or unreachability, but there need be only
one correct node. All other nodes may collude, and no one
needs to know or guess which node is correct.
5.2.3 Proactive anti-equivocation via witnessing
Although the accountability mechanisms above ensure
that correct nodes will eventually expose equivocation by
malicious nodes, protocols built atop TLC might still be
subverted in the short term by equivocation attacks be-
fore the equivocation is detected. In witnessed TLC with
the witness threshold tw satisfying the majoritarian con-
straints above, however, the threshold witnessing process
built into each TLC time-step offers a natural proactive
form equivocation protection, a consequence of the proac-
tive accountability offered by witness cosigning [155].
In particular, protocols built atop TLC with a majoritar-
ian witness threshold can rely on never seeing two equiv-
ocating threshold witnessedmessages. This is because for
any malicious node to get two equivocating messages for
the same time step threshold witnessed, it would have to
obtain a transferable body of evidence including a witness
threshold tw of valid, properly-signed witness acknowl-
edgment messages for each. This threshold would require
a majority of correct nodes to witness and cosign each
equivocating message, implying that at least one correct
node would have to sign both messages. But if a correct
1 Specific distributed protocols built atop TLC may, of course, re-
quire that correct nodes outnumber malicious nodes. One such example
is the AVSS-based asynchronous distributed key generation protocol we
develop later in Section 6.2.
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Figure 10: Global time periods demarked by the moments
a majority of correct nodes reach a threshold time t.
node ever sees a second messages with the same sequence
number from the same node, it does not accept or witness
the second, but instead uses it as evidence to expose the
equivocating node’s self-evident misbehavior.
5.2.4 Majoritarian time period delineation
With the above adjustments to the thresholds, the time pe-
riod delineation described earlier in Section 2.8 extends
naturally to the Byzantine environment. In particular, the
“critical moment” that determineswhen a new time period
s begins is the moment when a majority of correct nodes
reach step s. When any the fc Byzantine nodes advance
their clocks is thus irrelevant to the conceptual delineation
of time periods. Figure 10 illustrates this process.
Even though the correct nodes have no realistic means
of determining either which other nodes are correct or pre-
cisely when each time period begins and ends, neverthe-
less this conceptual delineation imposes strict bounds on
when any valid message labeled for a given time step may
have been formulated.
• First, as long as the message threshold tm satisfies
the above constraints, no one can reach or produce a
valid message for time step s+1 or later before time
period s has started. Reaching step s + 1 requires
exhibiting a “body of evidence” that includes valid,
properly-signedmessages from a threshold t of mes-
sages from step s. This threshold set must include a
majority of the correct nodes even after being “maxi-
mally corrupted” by up to fc Byzantine nodes. Since
such a majority of correct nodes is unavailable until
a majority of correct nodes reach step s and thus col-
lectively enter time period s, no malicious node can
produce a valid message labeled s+1 or later before
period s starts, without being exposed as corrupt.
• Second, in witnessed TLC where tw satisfies the
above constraints, no one can formulate and produce
any new threshold witnessed message for step s after
time period s ends and period s + 1 begins. This is
because such a message would have to be verifiably
witnessed by a threshold tw that includes a major-
ity of correct nodes even after being maximally cor-
rupted by up to fc Byzantine nodes. Such a majority
of correct nodes is unavailable after period s ends,
because correct nodes refuse to witness messages for
step s after having advanced to step s+1. A node that
formulates a messagem and gets at least onewitness
cosignature for it before period s ends might still be
able to finish gettingm threshold witnessed after pe-
riod s + 1 starts, but this does not violate the time
bounds becausem was formulated during step s.
5.2.5 Two-step broadcast
Byzantine-protected majoritarian witnessed TLC simi-
larly enforces the two-step broadcast property described
earlier in Section 2.9. Any message m a node broadcasts
at some step s that is threshold witnessed and used in ad-
vancing to step s+1 is guaranteed to have been witnessed
by a majority of correct nodes by the time they reach s+1.
This majority must overlap by at least one correct node
with the majority of correct nodes from which any node
must gather step s+ 1 messages to advance to step s+2.
This overlapping correct node will always reliably propa-
gate knowledge ofm, even if other malicious nodes might
“forget” or equivocate about it. Thus, the majorities of
correct nodes alone ensure that knowledge of each mes-
sage threshold witnessed at s+ 0 propagates to all nodes
by the time they reach s+ 2.
Even a malicious node cannot pretend not to have seen
m by s + 2, because the malicious node must exhibit the
appropriate body of evidence to convince correct nodes
it has reached s + 2 in the first place. That body of ev-
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Figure 11: Illustration of basic threshold logical clocks
without threshold witness certification.
Figure 12: Illustration of one witnessed TLC time-step
from the perspective of one particular node B.
idence must have a threshold of signed messages from
other nodes including at least one from a correct node that
conveys knowledge ofm, and the malicious node can nei-
ther omit nor forge this message referring to m without
producing an invalid log and being exposed as corrupt.
...
5.3 Byzantine Consensus with QSC
Byzantine-protecting the QSC3 consensus protocol de-
scribed in Section 4 involves two challenges: first, pro-
tecting the basic consensus logic and state machine
from Byzantine manipulation, and second, ensuring that
Byzantine nodes cannot leak the proposals’ genetic fitness
lottery tickets to the network adversary before the 3-step
consensus round is complete.
5.3.1 Protecting the QSC consensus logic
Each node’s QSC consensus logic must make two key
decisions in a consensus round starting at a given TLC
step s. First, the node must choose the best eligible (con-
firmed) proposal the node is aware of by step s+3, as the
proposal to build on in the next round. Second, the node
must determine whether it may consider this best eligible
proposal to be committed, according to whether the pro-
posal is reconfirmed (doubly confirmed) and not “spoiled”
by another proposal with a competitive lottery ticket.
The standard state machine accountability and verifica-
tion mechanisms above are sufficient to force even a ma-
licious node i to make these decisions correctly, or else be
exposed as misbehaving before their incorrect decisions
can affect any correct node. This is because both i’s best
eligible proposal decision and its commitment decision
are well-known, deterministic functions of the precise set
of causally prior messages i had seen by step s + 3 as
documented in i’s log. Upon receiving and processing i’s
broadcast at step s + 3, each correct node simply replays
i’s QSC consensus decisions independently based on the
same set of causally prior messages that i used, and ex-
pose i as misbehaving if its logged decisions are incorrect.
5.3.2 Protecting the lottery ticket values
As discussed in Section 4.9, QSC’s guarantee that each
round enjoys a reasonable (at least 1/2) independent prob-
ability of success holds only if the adversary cannot learn
the lottery ticket values early and use them to schedule
message delivery maliciously based on them. In addi-
tion, QSC’s success probability also depends on all nodes
choosing their proposals’ lottery tickets fairly from the
same random distribution. As soon as we admit even a
single Byzantine node (fc > 1), that node might break the
consensus protocol either by leaking all proposals’ lottery
ticket values to the network adversary during step s + 0,
or by choosing its own proposals’ lottery tickets unfairly,
e.g., so that the Byzantine node always wins.
Since we must assume a Byzantine node will leak any-
thing it knows to the adversary, we must force all nodes to
choose their proposals’ lottery tickets such that even they
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cannot learn, predict, or bias their choice of ticket before
it is revealed to all at step s + 3. Fortunately, a proto-
col such as RandHound [154], which implements public
randomness through leader-based verifiable secret shar-
ing (VSS) [144, 145, 152] provides the required function-
ality. We can readily incorporate such a protocol into QSC
for unpredictable and unbiasable lottery ticket selection.
5.3.3 QSC4: protecting the lottery tickets with PVSS
One solution is to use a Publicly Verifiable Secret Shar-
ing (PVSS) scheme that permits the homomorphic addi-
tion of multiple shared secrets generated by independent
dealers [38, 144, 152]. We extend QSC by one additional
TLC time-step, so that a full consensus round requires
four steps total (QSC4).
Initially at s+0, each node i chooses a random secret si
and a secret-sharing polynomial pi(x) such that pi(0) =
si. Node i’s polynomial pi(x) is of degree tm − fck −
1, where fck is the number of known corrupt nodes that
have been exposed so far in i’s view. Node i then deals
PVSS secret shares only to the n− fck nodes not known
to be corrupt. Node i includes its commitments to p(x)
and its publicly-verifiable encrypted shares in its step s+
0 proposal. Because these deals are publicly verifiable,
all correct nodes can immediately ensure that each node’s
deal is valid and immediately expose any node that deals
an incorrect secret (e.g., containing secret shares that the
intended recipients cannot decrypt).
We then embed the QSC3 consensus protocol into steps
1–4 of PVSS-based QSC4. At step s+1, each node has re-
ceived a threshold tm of PVSS secrets dealt at s+0. Each
node i chooses at least fcu + 1 such valid secrets dealt
by nodes not yet exposed in misbehavior from i’s view-
point, where fcu is the maximum number of unknown
potentially-corrupt nodes not yet exposed (fck + fcu =
fc). Because the set of fcu + 1 deals that i chooses must
include at least one by a correct node not colluding with
the adversary, this correct node’s deal both uniformly ran-
domizes i’s lottery ticket and ensures that it remains un-
known and unpredictable to i or anyone else until s + 4.
Nevertheless, i’s choice of a specific set of fcu + 1 deals
at s+1 represents a commitment to one and only one lot-
tery ticket, which thereafter cannot be changed or biased
by anyone including i.
At the end of the consensus round, each node includes
in its step s+ 4 message its decrypted shares from all the
deals it saw from step s+0. To determine the lottery ticket
for a given node i’s proposal pi from s + 1, each node j
must obtain and linearly interpolate tm shares, minus any
missing shares for nodes known corrupt by s + 1, from
each of the fcu + 1 deals that pi committed to, and com-
bine them to reconstruct the joint secret Si represented
by i’s chosen set of deals. While unpredictable and unbi-
asable, Si will be the same for all nodes that used the same
set of deals in their proposals, whereas we need each lot-
tery ticket Ti to be unique and independent for each node
i. We therefore use Si not directly as proposal i’s lottery
ticket, but as a key for a hash of some unique consensus
group ID G, consensus round number r, and node num-
ber: Ti = HSi(G, r, i).
Because decrypted shares from a majority of correct
nodes are required to reconstruct the secret dealt by any
correct node, anyone including the adversary can recon-
struct these secrets only after a majority of correct nodes
have reached s+ 4, and have thereby collectively entered
the next global time period following the completion of
the consensus round. At least for this majority of cor-
rect nodes, therefore, the adversarial network’s schedule
of message deliveries for this round is complete, fixed,
and “in the past” at this point, ensuring that this major-
ity of correct nodes observes the correct probabilities of
success discussed in Section 4.9. The network adversary
might affect the delivery schedules seen by the minor-
ity of correct nodes that reaches s + 4 later, and hence
the odds of success that these nodes directly observe. But
even such a “latecomer” node j will have by s + 5 heard
from at least one member i of the majority that was first to
reach s+ 4, and hence if i observed the round to succeed
at s+ 4 then j will know that fact as well by s+ 5.
It is possible that some PVSS deals used in proposals
at step s+1may not become known to all nodes by s+4,
making their dealt secrets unrecoverable by nodes that ob-
tain fewer than necessary shares at s + 4. The only pro-
posals eligible for consensus, however, are those that were
threshold witnessed during step s+1. As described in Sec-
tion 4.5, this guarantees that all nodes will have seen any
eligible proposal, and hence the deals it relies on, by s+3.
If a node cannot reconstruct some proposal’s lottery ticket
at s + 4, therefore, the node may assume this means the
proposal is ineligible and simply discard it.
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An advantage QSC4 has over most randomized asyn-
chronous Byzantine consensus protocols [3,19,32,33,36,
46, 47, 60, 70, 116, 120, 130] is that it needs no “common
coins” or the distributed key generation (DKG) processes
needed to establish them in practice without a trusted
dealer [73, 88]. Each proposer i effectively chooses its
own lottery ticket at s + 1, through its particular choice
of fcu + 1 deals to use, although i cannot tell in advance
what ticket value it chose and committed to. A disadvan-
tage of QSC4 is that because the readily-available PVSS
schemes may be used only once, all nodes must incur
the computational and communication costs of dealing,
verifying, and reconstructing fresh PVSS secrets for ev-
ery consensus round. We will explore later in Section 6
how we can build on QSC to implement an asynchronous
distributed key generation (DKG) protocol that produces
reusable shared secrets, amortizing the costs of this boot-
strap over many subsequent consensus rounds that can
generate public randomness much more efficiently as in
RandHound [154] or drand [96].
6 Distributed Key Generation
A large variety of security applications and services re-
quire, assume, or can benefit from a distributed key gen-
eration (DKG) protocol. DKG enables a group of nodes
to generate a threshold secret-shared public/private key
pair cooperatively, so that none of the members ever know
or learn the composite private key. Each member knows
a share of the private key, however, so that any thresh-
old number of members can work together to use it ac-
cording to an agreed-upon policy. Example applications
that typically depend on DKG include threshold schemes
for encryption and decryption [56, 148], digital sign-
ing [23, 147], identity-based encryption [14, 26, 87, 160],
public randomness beacons [33,96,154], secure data dele-
tion [72], accountable data access control [91], creden-
tial issuance and disclosure [150], electronic voting [144],
and general multiparty computation [21, 48, 74].
6.1 The Challenges of DKG
Distributed key generation in general is not easy, how-
ever. We could rely on a trusted dealer to deal shares
of a public/private keypair via verifiable secret sharing
(VSS) [31,40,81], but the trusted dealer is a single point of
compromise. We could require all n participating nodes
to deal secrets using VSS and combine all n deals ho-
momorphically to produce a joint secret that no one can
know or bias as long as at least one node is correct (the
anytrust model [163]), but this DKG process can toler-
ate no unavailability or unreachability and hence is highly
vulnerable to denial-of-service.
Combining only fc + 1 VSS deals is sufficient in
principle to ensure that it includes at least one con-
tribution by a correct node. There are
(
n
fc+1
)
possible
choices of such subsets, however, and the group must
agree on one and only one particular subset, an agree-
ment task that requires consensus. Most of the practical
and efficient asynchronous algorithms rely on common
coins [3,19,33,36,46,47,60,70,116,120,130], yielding a
chicken-and-egg problem. We need common coins to en-
able asynchronous consensus to agree on a particular set
of VSS deals to generate a distributed keypair to produce
common coins.
One way around this challenge is to drive the DKG
process using traditional leader-based consensus, which
introduces partial synchrony assumptions to ensure live-
ness [73, 88]. Another circumvention is to assume the
group evolves gradually via a series of occasional group
reconfiguration and DKG events. The first DKG runs
manually or synchronously. For each subsequent DKG
event, an existing asynchronous consensus group using
common coins from the previous DKG configuration
agrees asynchronously on a set of VSS deals representing
the next configuration. While supporting full asynchrony
after initial launch, this approach unfortunately makes the
security of every DKG configuration critically dependent
on that of all past configurations. If any one configuration
is ever threshold compromised, then the adversary can re-
tain control forver and security is never recoverable.
6.2 Que Sera Distributed Key Generation
Because QSC requires no already-agreed-upon common
coins, we can adapt it for asynchronousDKGwithout par-
tial synchrony or secure history assumptions. We call the
result que sera distributed key generation or QSDKG.
The main remaining technical challenge is that to give
all nodes reusable long-term key shares, we cannot use
PVSS schemes that encrypt the shares into exponents to
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make them amenable to zero-knowledge proofs. We must
therefore make do with (non-publicly-)verifiable secret
sharing (VSS) schemes, in which an encrypted share is
verifiable only by the share’s recipient.
To protect liveness, the DKG protocol will have to wait
until only a threshold tw of nodes have had a chance
to verify their shares of any given deal before moving
on. This leaves a risk, however, that a misbehaving node
may deal incorrect shares to up to fa correct nodes un-
detectably during the DKG. Since we cannot detect this
situation before the DKG completes, the network ad-
versary could compromise liveness later if any correct
nodes are missing shares dealt for a full tm threshold. We
must therefore ensure that all correct nodes obtain correct
shares, including the fa that couldn’t verify their shares
during DKG itself. For this purpose we adapt techniques
from asynchronous verifiable secret sharing (AVSS) [31].
In addition to the majoritarian message and witness
thresholds tm and tw each satisfying
n+fc
2
< t ≤ n− fa
as discussed in Section 5.2.2, QSDKG also relies on a
share recovery threshold tr satisfying the constraints fc <
tr ≤ n−fa−fc. In a classic Byzantine consensus config-
uration in which fa = fc = f and n > 3f , for example,
we set tm = tw = n− f and tr = n− 2f , so tr > f .
To generate a new distributed keypair starting at TLC
time step s+0, each node deals a fresh secret by choosing
a random bivariate polynomial p(x, y) of degree tm − 1
in x and of degree tr − 1 in y. The dealer’s secret is
p(0, 0). The dealer includes in its TLC step s + 0 broad-
cast a tm × tr matrix of commitments to the polynomial,
and an n × n matrix of secret shares, each share Sij en-
crypted with a random blinding exponent rij such that
Sij = g
rijp(i, j). Finally, for each i and j, the dealer
includes in its step s + 0 broadcast ElGamal encryptions
of grij to each of node i’s and node j’s public keys, along
with a zero-knowledge proof that the dealer knows rij and
that these ElGamal encryptions to nodes i and j are con-
sistent. A misbehaving dealer can still incorrectly encrypt
the share Sij , but if it does so, both nodes i and j will
be able to detect and expose this misbehavior by reveal-
ing the blinding factor rij along with a zero-knowledge
proof of either ElGamal ciphertext’s correct opening. For
this deal to be eligible for subsequent use in the DKG,
the dealer must obtain a witness threshold tw of cosigna-
tures on it its s + 0 broadcast. Correct witnesses provide
these signatures only if both their rows and columns of the
dealer’s share matrix check out; otherwise they expose the
dealer’s misbehavior by opening an incorrect share.
At step s + 1, each node i then chooses and proposes
a particular set of fc + 1 threshold witnessed deals from
step s + 0, then commences a series of 3-step consensus
rounds at least until all nodes have observed commitment.
Each node i’s particular choice of fc + 1 deals at s + 1
determines the lottery ticket associated with i’s proposal
in the first consensus round starting at s + 1. In subse-
quent rounds, each proposal’s lottery ticket is determined
by the set of deals from the first proposal in the history the
proposer builds on. If in the first consensus round node
i chooses node j’s step s + 1 proposal as the best eli-
gible, then the lottery ticket for node i’s proposal in the
second round starting at step s + 4 is determined by the
deal node j chose at s + 1, since that is the deal at the
“base” of the history i adopted. In this way, as soon as all
nodes have observed commitment at least once, they will
all have agreed on a common prefix history including a
common choice of fc+1 deails to serve as the DKG result.
The participating nodes can then cease consensus rounds
if only the DKG result was needed, or continue them if
regular consensus is still needed for other purposes.
Accounting for the fa correct nodes that may not have
a chance to verify their shares in a given deal, plus the fc
nodes that might dishonestly verify their shares, we can
be sure that at least n − fa − fc full rows and columns
of the encrypted share matrix were properly verified by
correct nodes. Since tr ≤ n − fa − fc, this ensures that
every node i will obtain enough correct shares of its re-
sharing polynomial, represented by p(i, y) with threshold
tr, to reconstruct its share of the main secret sharing poly-
nomial, represented by p(x, 0) with threshold tm. Since
tr > fc, however, the fc misbehaved nodes cannot alone
reconstruct and learn the secret shares of correct nodes.
7 Logical Time Meets Real Time
As discussed earlier in Section 3.1, correctly observing
and interacting with real wall-clock time is often impor-
tant even in distributed protocols and services we would
like to pace asynchronously as fast as network connec-
tivity permits. Beyond basic time-centric services such
as clock synchronization, application-logic and policies
often depend on real time. In trusted time stamping or
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blockchain-based content notarization, for example, we
would like to produce proof that content existed at a
particular real time. In smart contract systems such as
Ethereum [164], we often want a smart contract to allow
or trigger some action at a particular future time, or al-
low an action only until a deadline. In games and mar-
kets systems, users would like to encrypt their bids for re-
lease only at a synchronized closing time, to guard against
front running [50,61]. In all of these situations, even if we
might like the consensus and application logic to run as
quickly as network conditions permit, time-dependent ap-
plications typically would like to refer to real wall-clock
times rather than logical times or block numbers. This
section explores methods for ensuring that logical time
can observe and interact with real time securely.
7.1 Securing timestamps in blockchains
We first address the problem of merely observing real
time accurately in asynchronous systems driven by TLC.
In either a basic distributed timestamping or beacon
service where each node produces its own log (Sec-
tion 3.1.1), or a consensus-based service in which nodes
use consensus to agree on a common blockchain, we
would like each new log entry or block a node produces to
have an accurate wall-clock timestamp. But how can we
ensure these timestamps are accurate, given that different
nodes’ clocks may lose synchronization for many reason,
and corrupt nodes might even deliberately set their clocks
arbitrarily forward or back with respect to reality?
Witness cosigning [68, 122, 155] offers a partial solu-
tion: the proposer of a new log entry or block simply
includes in the block a wall-clock timestamp based on
the proposer’s notion of the current time. The proposer
must then obtain cosignatures from a threshold number of
group members serving as witnesses. An obvious idea is
for witnesses to sanity-check the proposer’s time stamp
against their own clocks, rejecting and refusing to wit-
ness the proposal for example if the proposed time stamp
is outside a tolerance winder either before or after the
witness’s real-time clock. This way, the fact that a pro-
posal has been threshold witnessed should indicate that
the block’s time stamp is “reasonably” accurate accord-
ing to a number of nodes, to within some fixed tolerance: a
malicious proposer cannot maliciously time stamp a block
either way in the past or way in the future.
The need to pick an arbitrary before-and-after tolerance
window, however, seems akin to a timeout, inconsistent at
least in spirit with fully-asynchronous systems, and works
against the principle that they should be self-timed. Too
large a tolerance window gives malicious nodes greater
leeway to manipulate time stamps they produce, while
too small a tolerance windowmay trigger false positive in
which witnesses refuse to cosign a time stamp that is out-
of-windowmerely because of exceptional network delays
or DoS attacks. We would prefer a way for witnesses to
“keep proposers honest” in their time stamps without im-
posing arbitrary thresholds.
In a group that uses TLC and QSC to produce a col-
lective time stamped blockchain, we can leverage TLC’s
delay-tolerance to constrain the inaccuracy of generated
time stamps without imposing artificial tolerance win-
dows. At the beginning of each QSC consensus round,
each node proposing a potential block includes a time
stamp containing the current time according to the pro-
poser’s internal clock. When another node receives this
time stamped proposal, it first verifies that the proposal’s
time stamp does not violate monotonicity by “turning
back the clock” or failing to increase it with respect
to whichever previous block the proposal builds on.
A monotonicity violation is an immediately-detectable
correctness failure, which the receiver can expose sim-
ply by gossiping the signed but invalid proposal. Since
QSC guarantees that the correct nodes in a group win
a significant percentage of the proposed blocks, and we
assume that correct nodes have reasonably correctly-
synchronized clocks, the most a badly-synchronized or
malicious node can date a proposal in the past is back to
just after the time stamp of the most recent block proposed
by a correct node. Since the block consensus rate depends
on network conditions, the faster the rate at which the net-
work permits TLC to pace the group, the more tightly-
constrained a slow or malicious node’s time stamps will
be against accidental or deliberate proposal back-dating.
After verifying monotonicity, the receiver of a proposal
also checks if the proposed time stamp is in the future
with respect to its own real-time clock. If so, the receiver
does not reject the proposal, but instead merely delays its
processing internally until the indicated time has passed
according to the receiver’s clock. If the proposer’s clock
is ahead of the receiver’s, the arrival of a future-dated time
stamp at the receiver will thus simply cause the receiver
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to add a corresponding delay. If the proposer’s clock is
significantly fast with respect to correct nodes, then all
correct nodes will similarly delay the future-dated pro-
posal. If the future-dated proposal eventually wins the
QSC consensus lottery, then by the time it commits it will
no longer be in the future from the perspective of a ma-
jority of correct nodes, and thus will “no longer” be viola-
tion of time stamp correctness. If proposer is future-dated
enough, however, then the delays that all correct nodes
impose on its processing will decrease and potentially
eliminate the chance the proposal has of being threshold
witnessed or chosen by QSC consensus, just as if the pro-
poser was actually just a too-slow or unavailable node that
the rest of the group cannot “wait around for” without vi-
olating its threshold liveness.
Delaying the processing of forward-dated proposals at
correct nodes serves simultaneously both to “correct” the
time stamp by ensuring the proposal cannot be agreed
on by consensus until a majority of correct nodes agree
that its timestamp has passed, and also serves to “pun-
ish” the proposer gracefully by making the forward-dated
proposal less likely to win consensus to whatever extent
the added delays disadvantage the forward-dated proposal
with respect to those of correct nodes. Because chance of
a forward-dating node’s proposals getting picked by QSC
will disappear as soon as the time stamps in its proposals
for a given round are higher than those of most correct
and responsive nodes in the group, this provision effec-
tively constrains the amount by which a proposal may be
forward-dated and still get in the blockchain, according to
the distribution and variants of other clocks in the group.
Between the enforcement of time stamp monotonicity and
the delay of received messages with future time stamps,
therefore, the range in which poorly-synchronized or ma-
licious nodes can produce inaccurate block time stamps
is naturally constrained to an effectively self-timed toler-
ance that becomes tighter as network conditions allow the
group to proceed faster.
7.2 Asynchronous encrypted time vaults
As discussed earlier in Section 3.1.3, threshold identity-
based encryption (IBE) [26, 160], together with the asyn-
chronous distributed key generation needed to set it up
(Section 6), suggest an attractive approach to encrypted
time vaults allowing a ciphertext to be decrypted at a des-
ignated future time. The sender simply encrypts a mes-
sage to an IBE “identity” representing some future time.
The threshold group collectively holding the IBE master
key then simply generates and publicly releases the “pri-
vate key” for each time “identity” once that time has ar-
rived. Anyone can then use the released IBE private key to
decrypt any ciphertexts that were encrypted for that time.
If the threshold group generates and releases IBE pri-
vate keys for “time identities” representing TLC logical
clocks or block numbers, or wall-clock times in a fixed-
period schedule in which the group promises to release
exactly one private key per minute on the minute, for ex-
ample, then this works fine. Users of most applications
will probably not want to time-lock their messages for
logical clocks or block numberswith no predictable corre-
spondence to wall clock time, however, and using a fixed-
period release schedule again defeats the potential ben-
efits of asynchronous operation. If the fixed period is too
short, the group’s TLC coordinationmay not keep up with
it, requiring the group sometimes to release multiple keys
per TLC step to ensure that messages encrypted to certain
times aren’t left un-decryptable because of missing IBE
private key releases. If the fixed period is too long, users
(or smart contracts) are unnecessarily limited in the pre-
cision with which they can schedule future information
releases.
We can address this problem, however, by agreeing on a
convention betweenmessage encryptors and the threshold
group that accounts for uncertainty in the future rate and
schedule of IBE private key releases.
First, message encryptors produce ciphertexts en-
crypted for not just one but a logarithmic number of
future wall-clock time “identities”. This is typically
straightforward and efficient, since messages are typically
symmetric-key encrypted with a random ephemeral key,
and that ephemeral key in turn public-key encrypted. En-
crypting to multiple future time identities simply requires
IBE-encrypting the ephemeral key several times, increas-
ing the message size only slightly and not multiplicatively.
In particular, if the message sender’s ideal desired time-
release point is t, then the sender first encrypts to the time
identity for the exact binary representation of t. Then the
sender performs IEEE floating-point-style round-to-larger
to round t to an approximation t′ > t having at least
one fewer significant bits than t does, and encrypts the
message to the time identity corresponding to t′ as well.
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The sender repeats this successive round-to-higher and
encryption process until the target time representation has
only one significant bit. In this way, the ciphertext will be
decryptable by any of a logarithmic-size set of approxi-
mations to the target time, each less-precise approxima-
tion being more conservative (i.e., later).
When the threshold time vault beacon is operating
asynchronously and periodically releasing IBE private
keys, it similarly releases not just one but a small (log-
arithmic) set of keys at each TLC time step. Suppose
the previous block in the beacon’s blockchain was time
stamped t using the secure time stamping approach above,
and the next committed block built on it has time stamp
t′ > t. The precise wall-clock time stamp delta from one
block to the next, of course, depends on asynchronousnet-
work communication progress, unpredictable delays and
jitter in the network and nodes, and the QSC-randomized
selection of the winning proposal each consensus round.
But regardless of the time stamp delta, the threshold
group releases IBE private keys for time identities rep-
resenting not just the new time stamp t′, but also to the
time identities resulting from rounding t up to larger bi-
nary numbers with progressively fewer significant bits,
and also to the time identities resulting from rounding t′
down to smaller binary numbers with progressively fewer
significant bits, until these approximation processes “meet
in the middle” at some tm such that t ≤ tm ≤ t
′.
This process ensures that the time vault beacon’s re-
lease of IBE private keys effectively traverses a binary tree
of all possible time stamps, producing a private key for a
more-approximate time stamp with fewer significant bits
whenever the real time representing that position in the
conceptual binary time stamp tree passes. Since message
senders encrypt their messages to each possible precision,
corresponding to interior nodes in this binary time stamp
tree, the set of IBE private keys the time vault beacon gen-
erates is guaranteed to “hit” one of the time identities the
message sender encrypted the message for, eventually –
and with a maximum error approximately proportional to
the time stamp delta between the TLC consensus rounds
stamped immediately before (t) and immediately after (t′)
the sender’s ideal target time step.
In this way, senders can time-lock their messages (or
schedule events using them) for any desired time stamp
at any precision, without having to predict or guess the
rate at which the asynchronous IBE key-holder group will
progress and release keys at that future time. The time
vault beacon will release some key allowing decryption of
the message, with a varying time precision depending on
how quickly or slowly the group is actually progressing at
that time due to network conditions.
8 Robust, Efficient Causal Ordering
In preparation.
9 A Coordination Architecture
In the above expositions of TLC and QSC we have made
many simplifying assumptions for clarity, such as assum-
ing no Byzantine nodes and causally-ordered message
propagation. We also ignored many additional require-
ments, and optional but “nice-to-have” features, that we
often want in a practical distributed coordination system.
We now address the challenge of building practical
asynchronous distributed systems logically clocked by
TLC. Following the tradition of layering in network ar-
chitectures [41, 168], we will adopt a layered approach to
build progressively the functionality and abstractions we
need to implement TLC and QSC in a conceptually clean
and modular fashion. Consistent with layered architecture
tradition, each layer in our distributed coordination archi-
tecture will depend on and build on only the layers below
it to add a minimal increment of functionality or abstrac-
tion needed by or useful to the layers above it.
A key goal of this architecture is to tolerate not only
an asynchronous network but also Byzantine node behav-
ior. The Byzantine consensus problem is traditionally ad-
dressed using protocols specifically designed for this pur-
pose [39], which are fairly different throughout from their
non-Byzantine counterparts such as Paxos [98, 99]. The
architecture introduced here, in contrast, shows how the
application of relatively standard protection tools in ap-
propriate architectural layers, such as cryptographic algo-
rithms, Shamir secret sharing [144,145,152], and PeerRe-
view [78,79], can make the QSC protocol described above
Byzantine fault tolerant without any fundamental changes
to the consensus protocol’s basic logic or operation.
Figure 13 briefly summarizes the layers of the dis-
tributed coordination architecture we develop here. While
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Layer Description
consensus single globally-consistent historical timeline
randomness unpredictable, unbiasable public randomness
time release withholds information until designated time
threshold time communication-driven global notion of time
witnessing threshold certification that nodes saw messages
causality ensures nodes have complete causal history views
real time labeling events with approximate wall-clock time
messaging direct messaging between pairs of nodes
Figure 13: Layered architecture for threshold logical time
and consensus atop asynchronous networks
important interdependencies between the functional ab-
stractions implemented by the layers motivate this lay-
ering, there is nothing fundamental or necessary about a
layered approach or this particular layering: many other
decompositions are certainly possible.
As usual, layering achieves modularity and simplicity
of each layer at a potential risk of introducing imple-
mentation inefficiencies due to cross-layer coordination,
or potentially increasing the complexity of the complete
system over a tightly-focused and carefully-optimized
“monolithic” design. Many “cross-layer” optimizations
and simplifications are likely to be possible and desir-
able in practical implementations. This layering scheme
is intended to be a conceptual model to simplify reason-
ing about complex distributed coordination processes, not
a prescription for an optimal implementation.
While this architecture is driven by the goal of devel-
oping a clean, modular, efficient, and practical approach
to asynchronous Byzantine consensus, many of the lower
layers that the architecture incorporates can also serve
other, general purposes even in distributed systems that
may not necessarily require consensus. Shorter stacks
comprised of only a subset of the layers described here
may be useful in such situations.
9.1 Basic elements of consensus
Before developing the architecture layer-by-layer, we first
break down the architecture’s layers into three functional
categories representing three basic elements of consnesus:
choice, timing, and rapport between participants.
Choice: Consensus requires choosing making a choice
among alternatives: typically by choosing among either
leaders or among proposals. Leader-driven protocols such
as Paxos and PBFT first choose a leader and that leader
drives the choices until the leader fails (the detection of
which typically requires timeouts, violating asynchrony),
resulting in a view change. In randomness-driven consen-
sus protocols such as Bitcoin and this, participants first
form potential choices for each round, then we use a
source of randomness to choose among them. Supporting
this choice among proposals is the purpose of the random-
ness layer in our archiecture, which in turn builds on the
time release layer immediately below it.
Timing: In any consensus algorithm, nodes need to
know when to make a choice (or when a choice has been
made), either among proposals for a decision or among
potential (new) leaders. Much of the complexity of leader-
based protocols is due to the difficulty of coordinating
the numerous timing-related decisions nodes must make:
when a proposal is accepted, when a proposal is com-
mitted, when a node decides that a leader has failed,
when enough nodes have decided this to trigger a view
change, when a new leader knows enough to take over
from the last one, etc. Asynchronous consensus proto-
cols fundamentally need to be threshold-based rather than
timeout-based in their timing decisions, but while simple
in concept (simply wait for “enough” messages to arrive),
the question of how many messages of what kinds are
“enough” often tends to be complex. Our architecture uses
threshold logical time to decompose all the main timing
and progress decisions into a separate layer – the thresh-
old time layer – that uses simple threshold logic to form
a global logical clock to drive all key timing decisions in
the layers above it.
Rapport: Consensus participants need not only “raw
communication” with each other, but also in practice need
a way to know what other participants know at a given
point. This mutual understanding is often required for a
node to know when a sufficient number of other nodes
know “enough” so that an important fact (such as a pro-
posal’s acceptance or commitment) will not be forgot-
ten by the group even if individual nodes fail. While
monolithic consensus protocols use integrated, ad hoc
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mechanisms to achieve the inter-node rapport needed for
consensus, our architecture instead decomposes rapport-
establishment functions into separate lower layers that can
be easily understood and cleanly implemented.
In particular, three layers of our architecture are de-
voted to three complementary forms of rapport-building.
Our witnessing layer enables nodes to learn when a
threshold of participants have seen and validated a par-
ticular message or historical event. Our causality layer
enables nodes to reason causally about history and deter-
mine precisely what events other nodes had seen before a
given message or event. Finally, our gossip layer ensures
that participants can exchange information and build rap-
port indirectly as well as directly, so that correct nodes
with slow or unreliable connectivity may still be included
as reliably and securely as possible in consensus.
9.2 Four contrasting notions of time
While this paper’s central novel contribution is the no-
tion of asynchronous threshold time and a distributed co-
ordination and consensus architecture built on it, this ar-
chitecture also internally leverages and builds upon other
classic, complementary notions of time. We utilize four
different conceptual notions of time, in fact, in different
elements and for different purposes in the architecture:
• Real time: Although consensus in our architecture
is driven asynchronously purely by communication
and requires no timeouts, we nevertheless use real or
“wall-clock” time, as measured by each node’s sys-
tem clock, to label blocks with the date and time they
were committed, and to allow the timed release of
contributions after designated moments in real time
as described below. We assume that correct nodes’
system clocks are roughly synchronized purely for
these block-labeling and timed-release purposes, but
Byzantine nodes’ clocks may behave arbitrarily.
• Node-local log time: For coordination and account-
ability purposes each nodemaintains its own tamper-
evident append-only log of all the nondeterminis-
tic events it observes, such as message arrivals, as
described below. Each such event increments the
node’s local log time by one, independent of real
wall-clock time or other nodes’ log timelines.
• Vector time:As nodes communicate and learn about
new events in other nodes’ logs, each node i main-
tains an N -element vector of the most recent local
log times it knows about across all nodes. This vec-
tor time [63, 66, 105, 114] represents the exact set of
historical events across all nodes that are causally
prior to the present moment at node i. Our architec-
ture uses vector time to enable nodes to reason about
what other nodes saw or knew at specific historical
moments, and for systematic accountability via ac-
countable state machines [78, 79].
• Threshold logical time: Finally, our consensensus
architecture both provides and internally uses thresh-
old logical time as a global metric of asynchronous
communication progress across the (fastest threshold
subset of) all N participants.
9.3 The consensus architecture by layer
We now briefly describe the functional purpose of each
layer in the consensus architecture. For clarity, we also
point out at least one simplistic potential “baseline” im-
plementation approach for each layer. These baseline im-
plementations approaches are meant only to be illustra-
tive, and would meet neither our efficiency nor security
objectives in practice. We defer the description of more
practical and secure, but also inevitably more complex,
implementations of these layers to Section 5.
Messaging layer: The messaging layer represents the
baseline functionality this architecture builds on, namely a
primitive point-to-point communication capability allow-
ing message transmission directly between pairs of nodes.
In Internet-based deployments, the messaging layer in our
architecture typically maps to connections via TCP, TLS,
or another point-to-point overlay protocol.
This layer effectively represents the underlying net-
work infrastructure that this paper’s architecture build on
top of, and thus is not implemented in this architecture
but instead represents the underlying network API (e.g.,
TCP/IP) that the architecture builds on.
We do not assume the underlying messaging layer sup-
ports broadcast or multicast, but can make use of such a
facility if available. If no broadcast/multicast is available
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in the underlyingmessaging layer, then a broadcast/multi-
cast simply meansN point-to-point transmissions to each
of the N participants.
Real time layer: The optional real time layer enables
the asynchronous, self-timed group of nodes to interact
correctly with wall-clock time to enable time-based appli-
cations such as those described in Section 3.1. Upon trans-
mitting a new message, each node includes a wall-clock
timestamp in the message representing its local clock at
the time of transmission. Upon receiving a timestamp-
labeled message, correct nodes delay internal delivery of
the message if necessary until the receiver “agrees” with
the sender that the message’s indicated timestamp has
passed, as detailed in Section 7.
Causality layer: This layer provides “rapport” among
nodes as discussed above, by ensuring that whenever one
node receives a message from another, the receiver knows
or effectively learns not just the message’s content but ev-
erything the sender had observed upon sending the mes-
sage.
A simple implementation of this layer might simply tag
all transmitted messages with vector timestamps [63, 66,
105, 114], to define a precise “happens-before” causality
relationship between events, then use these vector times-
tamps to delay the internal delivery of received messages
(much as TCP does) until causally prior messages have
been received and delivered. This simplistic approach
works if nodes never fail and messages are always eventu-
ally delivered, but must be refined and augmented in prac-
tice to handle failures.
A more robust solution to causal delivery is for this
layer to build on a reliable broadcast protocol [34, 107],
which ensure a message’s eventual delivery to all nodes
provided not too many nodes fail or misbehave, but typ-
ically require each message to be rebroadcast by O(N)
nodes. A more practically efficient approach to achieving
this robustness is to build on gossip protocols [55, 103],
which handle only sparsely-connected networks and are
easily adapted to enforce causal ordering at the level of
pairwise interactions between nodes. Section 8 discusses
these approaches in more detail.
Witnessing: The witnessing layer allows a node i that
sent some message m to learn – and further indicate
to other nodes – when some threshold Tw of partici-
pants have received and confirmed seeing m. The wit-
nessing layer thus performs a function analogous to ac-
knowledgment in reliable point-to-point protocols like
TCP, but generalized to group communication contexts in
which many of the N participants are expected to receive
and witness (acknowledge) each message that any group
member receives.
Once a node has collected Tw witness acknowledg-
ments on a messagem, we say that the message has been
witnessed. This layer delivers received messages locally
to upper layers only once they are witnessed. The impor-
tant property this behavior enforces is that once a higher
layer on any node i has received a message m from an-
other node via the witnessing layer, i knows that at least
Tw nodes total have seen and validatedm, not just i itself.
Upper layers can control when and under what conditions
the witnessing layer starts or stops witnessing messages
of specific classes (e.g., messages labeled with particular
identifiers in their headers), to enforce semantic and tem-
poral properties defined by the upper layer.
A trivial implementation of this layer, which assumes
that all nodes are well-behaved, is simply for each node
to reply with an acknowledgment to each new upper-layer
protocol message the node receives, just as TCP/IP and
numerous other classic protocols do. Byzantine-protected
instantiations outlined in Section 5 use digital signatures
to produce transferable but cryptographically unforgeable
“evidence” of message receipt, and use threshold sign-
ing [23, 147] or witness cosigning [68, 122, 155] to com-
press the space and verification costs of reducing O(N)
witness cosignatures on the same message. In addition,
Byzantine-protected implementations of this layer can of-
fer proactive protection against equivocation and other
detectable forms of misbehavior, because honest nodes
will not witness-cosign invalid or equivocating messages.
Threshold time: The threshold time layer implements a
global notion of time operating in lock-step across all the
N nodes, in contrast with the node-local sequence num-
bers and clocks implemented by the vector time layer. In
essence, at any given threshold time t, the threshold time
layer at each node i waits until it has received time tmes-
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sages from a threshold of Tm unique nodes before advanc-
ing to time t+ 1.
Since the threshold time layer builds upon the witness-
ing layer, the collection of Tm messages a node i needs
to advance to time t + 1 is in fact a collection of Tm wit-
nessed messages, each of which has been witnessed (ac-
knowledged or signed) by at least Tw nodes. In addition,
the threshold time layer at any node i uses its control over
the witnessing layer to start witnessing messages labeled
with time t only upon reaching time t and not before, and
to stop witnessing time t messages upon reaching time
t+1, ensuring in effect that messages witnessed by correct
nodes at time t were witnessed during logical time t and
not before or after. This interaction between the witness-
ing and threshold time layer ensures the important prop-
erty that upon advancing to time t+1, each node i knows
that at least Tm messages from time twere each seen (and
witnessed) by at least Tw nodes during threshold time t.
Since each node may reach its condition for advancing
from t to t + 1 at different wall-clock times, logical time
advancement generally occurs at varying real times on
different nodes. In a Byzantine consensus context where
N ≥ 3f + 1 and Tm = Tw = 2f + 1, however, we can
divide wall-clock time into periods demarked by the mo-
ment at which exactly f + 1 correct nodes have reached
a given threshold time t. That is, wall-clock time period t
starts the moment any set of exactly f + 1 correct nodes
have reached threshold time t, and ends once any set of
exactly f + 1 correct nodes reach threshold time t + 1.
Because a majority of (f + 1) correct nodes must wit-
ness a time t message in order for it to be successfully
witnessed and delivered to the threshold time and higher
layers, and no correct node will witness a time t message
after advancing to t+1, this means that a message formu-
lated after the end of global period t can never be success-
fully witnessed by the required threshold of Tw nodes, and
therefore will never be delivered to upper layers on any
correct node.
Time release: This layer schedules information to be
revealed at a later time, which might be defined either
based on a threshold time, as needed by QSC to protect
lottery tickets, or based on a target wall-clock time, as
needed by applications such as smart contracts and time
vaults (see Section 3.1.3).
In a trivial implementation for a non-Byzantine envi-
ronment, each node simply labels information with the
threshold time it is supposed to be released, and the
(trusted) time release layer implementation at each node i
is responsible for delaying the release of that information
to upper layers until node i has reached the designated re-
lease time t. This simple implementation approach might
be suitable in a cluster, cloud, or data center context in
which all the nodes’ implementations of this layer are un-
der control of the same administrative authority anyway,
or in a hardware-attested context such as within Intel SGX
enclaves [84].
Byzantine-protected implementations of this layer in-
stead typically use verifiable secret sharing (VSS) [144,
145, 152], together with threshold identiy-based encryp-
tion [14, 26, 87, 160] to encrypt the time-release informa-
tion such that a threshold of nodes must release shares
of the decryption key upon advancing to the appropriate
time, enabling any node to be able to learn the encrypted
information.
Public Randomness: This layer builds on crypto-
graphic commitment and time release layer to provide
unpredictable, bias-resistant public randomness at each
threshold logical time-step s. It is needed both by the
Byzantine-hardened QSC consensus protocol, and use-
ful in practice for many other purposes outlined in Sec-
tion 3.2.
A trivial implementation is just to pick a random num-
ber and transmit it via the time release layer. Practical
Byzantine-protected implementations typically generate
public randomness via secret sharing [33, 154], such as
the PVSS-based approach outlined in Section 5.3.3, or us-
ing a more efficient asynchronous randomn beacon set up
using DKG as discussed in Section 6.
Consensus: The consensus layer, finally, builds on the
abstractions provided by the lower layers to implement ro-
bust, efficient consensus enabling the group to agree on a
serialized history. QSC3 (Section 4) achieves this in a fail-
stop threat model, while QSC4 (Section 5.3.3) provides
protection against Byzantine nodes. There are certainly
many other ways to implement the consensus layer, how-
ever, which will embody different sets of tradeoffs and de-
pendencies on lower layers. Again, this layering scheme
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is suggested as a conceptual reference, not a prescription
for a specific implementation of any or all the layers.
10 Formal Development of TLC
In preparation.
11 Experimental Evaluation
In preparation.
12 Related Work
This section summarizes related work, focusing first on
TLC in relation to classic logical clocks, then on QSC in
relation to the large body of prior work on consensus.
12.1 Logical Clocks and Virtual Time
Threshold logical clocks are of course inspired by classic
notions of logical time, such as Lamport clocks [97], vec-
tor clocks [63, 66, 105, 114], and matrix clocks [59, 132,
140, 141, 165]. We even use vector and matrix clocks as
building blocks in implementing TLC.
Prior work has used logical clocks and virtual time
for purposes such as discrete event simulation and roll-
back [85], verifying cache coherence protocols [126], and
temporal proofs for digital ledgers [83]. We are not aware
of prior work defining a threshold logical clock abstrac-
tion or using it to build asynchronous consensus or dis-
tributed key generation protocols, however.
Conceptually analogous to TLC, Awerbuch’s synchro-
nizers [13] are intended to simplify the design of dis-
tributed algorithms by presenting a synchronous abstrac-
tion atop an asynchronous network. Awerbuch’s synchro-
nizers assume a fully-reliable system, however, tolerating
neither availability nor correctness failures in participants.
TLC’s purposemight therefore be reasonably described as
building fault-tolerant synchronizers.
The basic threshold communication patterns TLC em-
ploys have appeared in numerous protocols in various
forms, such as classic reliable broadcast algorithms [28,
29, 133]. Witnessed TLC is inspired by threshold signa-
ture schemes [23,147], signed echo broadcast [2,32,133],
and witness cosigning protocols [68,122,155].We are not
aware of prior work to develop or use a form of logical
clock based on these threshold primitives, however.
12.2 Asynchronous Consensus Protocols
The FLP theorem [65] implies that consensus protocols
must sacrifice one of safety, liveness, asynchrony, or de-
terminism. Paxos [98, 99] and its leader-based deriva-
tives for fail-stop [22, 82, 124, 134] and Byzantine con-
sensus [10,20,39,43,44,95,166] sacrifice asynchrony by
relying on timeouts to ensure progress, leaving them vul-
nerable to performance and DoS attacks [6, 44]. QSC in-
stead sacrifices determinism and uses randomness.
Consensus protocols have employed randomness in
many ways. Some use private coins that nodes flip inde-
pendently, but require time exponential in group size [18,
28]. Others assume that the network embodies random-
ness in the form of a fair scheduler [29]. More prac-
tical randomized consensus protocols handling arbitrary
asynchrony typically rely on shared coins [3, 19, 32, 33,
36, 46, 47, 60, 70, 116, 120, 130]. Current practical meth-
ods of setting up shared coins, however, assume a trusted
dealer [31, 40, 81], a partially-synchronous network [73,
88], a weakened fault tolerance threshold [36, 37, 62], or
weakened termination guarantees [17, 36, 37], due to the
“chicken-and-egg” problem discussed in Section 6.1.
With fail-stop nodes, in contrast, QSC requires only
private randomness and private communication chan-
nels (Section 4.9). With Byzantine nodes, QSC relies
on leader-driven publicly-verifiable randomness, which a
public randomness protocol like RandHound [154] can
implement without requiring consensus (Section 5.3.3).
QSC’s “genetic consensus” approach (Section 4.2),
where each node maintains its own history but randomly
adopts those of others so as to converge statistically, is
partly inspired by randomized blockchain consensus pro-
tocols such as Bitcoin [121], Algorand [76], and DFIN-
ITY [1, 80]. These prior blockchain protocols rely on
synchrony assumptions, however, such as the essential
block interval parameter that paces Bitcoin’s proof-of-
work [75]. QSC in a sense provides Bitcoin-like genetic
consensus using TLC for fully-asynchronous pacing.
QSC builds on the classic techniques of tamper-evident
logging [49, 143], timeline entanglement [113], and ac-
countable state machines [78, 79] for general protection
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against Byzantine node behavior. Several recent DAG-
based blockchain consensus protocols [16, 52, 102, 127]
reinvent specialized variants of these techniques.
13 Conclusion
This paper has introduced a new type of logical clock
abstraction, which appears to be quite useful for sim-
plifying the design and implementation of asynchronous
distributed coordination systems such as consensus pro-
tocols, beacons, and other high-reliability services. The
concept is currently preliminary and still requires robust
implementations as well as detailed formal and experi-
mental analysis. Nevertheless, the approach seems inter-
esting for its conceptual modularity, for the simplicity
with which it implements asynchronous consensus given
the appropriate set of abstractions to build on, and for
enabling asynchronous verifiable secret sharing and dis-
tributed key generation without assuming trusted dealers
or common coins. The non-Byzantine QSC3, in particu-
lar, may represent a viable asynchronous competitor to the
venerable Paxos and its many variants, in terms of both
simplicity and practicality.
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Appendices
A TLC and QSC Model in Go
This appendix lists complete source code for a work-
ing model of Threshold Logical Clocks and Que Sera
Consensus in the Go language [77]. The model imple-
ments consensus only in the fail-stop (not Byzantine)
model, and it implements nodes as goroutines communi-
cating via shared memory instead of real network con-
nections. It is less than 250 code lines as counted by
cloc [53]. Despite its simplicity and limitations, this im-
plementation demonstrates all the fundamental elements
of TLC and QSC. The latest version of this model may
be found at https://github.com/dedis/tlc/
tree/master/go/model.
A.1 qsc.go: Que Sera Consensus
package model
// The TLC layer upcalls this method on advancing to a new time−step,
// with sets of proposals recently seen (saw) and threshold witnessed (wit ).
func (n ∗Node) advanceQSC(saw, wit set) {
// Calculate the starting step of the round that ’s just now completing.
s := n.tmpl. step − 3 // Three steps per round
if s < 0 {
return // Nothing to be done until the first round completes
}
// Find the best eligible proposal that was broadcast at s+0
// and that is in our view by the end of the round at s+3.
var bestProp ∗Message
var bestTicket int32
for p := range wit {
if p. step == s+0 && p. ticket >= bestTicket {
bestProp = p
bestTicket = p. ticket
}
}
// Determine if we can consider this proposal permanently committed.
45
committed := !n.spoiledQSC(s, saw, bestProp , bestTicket ) &&
n.reconfirmedQSC(s, wit , bestProp)
// Record the consensus results for this round (from s to s+3).
n. choice = append(n.choice , bestProp)
n.commit = append(n.commit, committed)
// Don’t bother saving history before the start of the next round.
n. save = s + 1
}
// Return true if there ’s another proposal competitive with a given candidate .
func (n ∗Node) spoiledQSC(s int, saw set , prop ∗Message, ticket int32) bool {
for p := range saw {
if p. step == s+0 && p.typ == Prop && p != prop &&
p. ticket >= ticket {
return true // victory spoiled by competition!
}
}
return false
}
// Return true if given proposal was doubly confirmed ( reconfirmed ).
func (n ∗Node) reconfirmedQSC(s int, wit set , prop ∗Message) bool {
for p := range wit { // search for a paparazzi witness at s+1
if p. step == s+1 && p.wit.has(prop) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
A.2 tlc.go: Threshold Logical Clocks
package model
import (
”math/rand”
)
// Create a copy of our message template for transmission .
// Also duplicates the slices within the template that are mutable.
func (n ∗Node) copyTemplate() ∗Message {
msg := n.tmpl // copy the message template
msg.saw = msg.saw.copy(0) // take snapshot of mutable saw set
msg.wit = msg.wit.copy(0) // take snapshot of mutable wit set
return &msg
}
// Broadcast a copy of our current message template to all nodes
func (n ∗Node) broadcastTLC() ∗Message {
msg := n.copyTemplate()
for , dest := range All {
dest .comm <− msg
}
return msg
}
// Unicast an acknowledgment of a given proposal to its sender
func (n ∗Node) acknowledgeTLC(prop ∗Message) {
msg := n.copyTemplate()
msg.typ = Ack
msg.prop = prop
All[prop.from].comm <− msg
}
// Advance to a new time step .
func (n ∗Node) advanceTLC(step int) {
// Initialize our message template for new time step
n.tmpl. step = step // Advance to new time step
n.tmpl. typ = Prop // Broadcast raw proposal first
n.tmpl.prop = nil // No proposal message yet
n.tmpl. ticket = rand. Int31n(MaxTicket) // Choose a ticket
n.tmpl.saw = n.tmpl.saw.copy(n. save) // prune ancient history
n.tmpl.wit = n.tmpl.wit . copy(n. save)
n.acks = make(set) // No acknowledgments received yet in this step
n.wits = make(set) // No threshold witnessed messages received yet
// Notify the upper (QSC) layer of the advancement of time,
// and let it fill in its part of the new message to broadcast .
n.advanceQSC(n.tmpl.saw, n.tmpl.wit)
n.tmpl.prop = n.broadcastTLC() // broadcast our raw proposal
}
// The network layer below calls this on receipt of a message from another node.
func (n ∗Node) receiveTLC(msg ∗Message) {
// Process broadcast messages in causal order and only once each,
// ignoring messages already processed or before recorded history .
// This will catch us up at least to the same step as msg.
if n.tmpl.saw.has(msg) || msg.step < n.save {
return
}
for prior := range msg.saw {
n.receiveTLC(prior ) // First process causally prior messages
}
if n.tmpl.saw.has(msg) || msg.step < n.save {
return // discard messages already seen or obsolete
}
n.tmpl.saw.add(msg) // record that we’ve seen this message
// Now process this message according to type .
switch msg.typ {
case Prop: // A raw unwitnessed proposal broadcast .
if msg.step == n.tmpl. step { // Acknowledge only in same step .
n.acknowledgeTLC(msg)
}
case Ack: // An acknowledgment. Collect a threshold of acknowledgments.
if msg.prop == n.tmpl.prop { // only if it acks our proposal
n.acks .add(msg)
if n.tmpl. typ == Prop && len(n.acks) >= Threshold {
n.tmpl. typ = Wit // threshold−witnessed cert
n.broadcastTLC()
}
}
case Wit: // A threshold−witnessed cert . Collect a threshold of them.
n.tmpl.wit . add(msg.prop) // collect all witnessed proposals
if msg.step == n.tmpl. step {
n.wits .add(msg.prop) // witnessed messages in this step
if len (n.wits ) >= Threshold {
n.advanceTLC(n.tmpl.step + 1) // advance time
}
}
}
}
A.3 node.go: Per-Node State Definitions
package model
var Threshold int // TLC and consensus threshold
var All []∗Node // List of all nodes
var MaxSteps int // Max number of consensus rounds to run
var MaxTicket int32 = 100 // Amount of entropy in lottery tickets
type Type int // Type of message
const (
Prop Type = iota // Raw unwitnessed proposal
Ack // Acknowledgment of a proposal
Wit // Threshold witness confirmation of proposal
)
type Message struct {
from int // Which node sent this message
step int // Logical time step this message is for
typ Type // Message type: Prop, Ack, or Wit
prop ∗Message // Proposal this Ack or Wit is about
ticket int32 // Genetic fitness ticket for this proposal
saw set // Recent messages the sender already saw
wit set // Threshold witnessed messages the sender saw
}
type Node struct {
comm chan ∗Message // Channel to send messages to this node
tmpl Message // Template for messages we send
save int // Earliest step for which we maintain history
acks set // Acknowledgments we’ve received in this step
wits set // Threshold witnessed messages seen this step
choice []∗Message // Best proposal this node chose each round
commit []bool // Whether we observed successful commitment
done chan struct {} // Run signals this when a node terminates
}
func newNode(self int ) (n ∗Node) {
n = &Node{}
n.comm = make(chan ∗Message, 3∗len(All)∗MaxSteps)
n.tmpl = Message{from: self, step : 0}
n.done = make(chan struct{})
return
}
func (n ∗Node) run() {
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n.advanceTLC(0) // broadcast message for initial time step
for MaxSteps == 0 || n.tmpl. step <MaxSteps {
msg := <−n.comm // Receive a message
n.receiveTLC(msg) // Process it
}
n.done <− struct{}{} // signal that we’re done
}
A.4 set.go: Message Sets
package model
// Use a map to represent a set of messages
type set map[∗Message]struct{}
// Test if msg is in set s .
func (s set ) has(msg ∗Message) bool {
, present := s[msg]
return present
}
// Add msg to set s .
func (s set ) add(msg ∗Message) {
s[msg] = struct {}{}
}
// Return a copy of message set s ,
// dropping any messages before earliest .
func (s set ) copy( earliest int ) set {
n := make(set)
for k, v := range s {
if k. step >= earliest {
n[k] = v
}
}
return n
}
A.5 model test.go: Testing the Model
package model
import (
”fmt”
” testing ”
)
// Run a consensus test case with the specified parameters .
func testRun( t ∗ testing .T, threshold , nnodes, maxSteps, maxTicket int ) {
if maxTicket == 0 { // Default to moderate−entropy tickets
maxTicket = 10 ∗ nnodes
}
desc := fmt. Sprintf (”T=%v,N=%v,Steps=%v,Tickets=%v”,
threshold , nnodes, maxSteps, maxTicket)
t .Run(desc, func( t ∗ testing .T) {
Threshold = threshold
All = make([]∗Node, nnodes)
MaxSteps = maxSteps
MaxTicket = int32 (maxTicket)
for i := range All { // Initialize all the nodes
All[ i ] = newNode(i)
}
for , n := range All { // Run the nodes on separate goroutines
go n.run()
}
for , n := range All { // Wait for each to complete the test
<−n.done
}
testResults ( t ) // Report test results
})
}
// Globally sanity−check and summarize each node’s observed results .
func testResults ( t ∗ testing .T) {
for i , n := range All {
commits := 0
for s , committed := range n.commit {
if committed {
commits++
for , nn := range All { // verify consensus
if nn.choice[s] != n.choice[s] {
panic(” safety violation !”)
}
}
}
}
t .Logf(”node %v committed %v of %v (%v%% success rate)”,
i , commits, len (n.commit), (commits∗100)/len(n.commit))
}
}
// Run QSC consensus for a variety of test cases .
func TestQSC(t ∗testing .T) {
testRun( t , 1, 1, 10000, 0) // Trivial case : 1 of 1 consensus!
testRun( t , 2, 2, 10000, 0) // Another trivial case : 2 of 2
testRun( t , 2, 3, 10000, 0) // Standard f=1 case
testRun( t , 3, 5, 1000, 0) // Standard f=2 case
testRun( t , 4, 7, 1000, 0) // Standard f=3 case
testRun( t , 5, 9, 1000, 0) // Standard f=4 case
testRun( t , 11, 21, 20, 0) // Standard f=10 case
testRun( t , 3, 3, 1000, 0) // Larger−than−minimum thresholds
testRun( t , 6, 7, 1000, 0)
testRun( t , 9, 10, 100, 0)
// Test with low−entropy tickets: hurts commit rate , but still safe !
testRun( t , 2, 3, 10000, 1) // Limit case : will never commit
testRun( t , 2, 3, 10000, 2) // Extreme low−entropy: rarely commits
testRun( t , 2, 3, 10000, 3) // A bit better bit still bad ...
}
B Promela Model for Spin Checker
This section contains a Promela model of the basic logic
of TLC and QSC, which supports exhaustive verification
of the state space using the Spin model checker. This im-
plementation currently models only non-Byzantine node
behavior and verifies only safety and not liveness or sta-
tistical progress guarantees. To avoid state space explo-
sion, it models messages merely as shared-memory in-
teractions. The model may be exhaustively checked (in
a couple minutes) using the run.sh script below.
B.1 qsc.pml: Promela model of QSC
#define N 4 // total number of nodes
#define Fa 1 // max number of availability failures
#define Fcu 1 // max number of unknown correctness failures
#define T (Fa+Fcu+1) // consensus threshold required
#define STEPS 3 // TLC time−steps per consensus round
#define ROUNDS 2 // number of consensus rounds to run
#define TICKETS 3 // proposal lottery ticket space
typedef Round {
bit sent [STEPS]; // whether we’ve sent yet each time step
byte ticket ; // lottery ticket assigned to proposal at t+0
byte seen[STEPS]; // bitmask of msgs we’ve seen from each step
byte prsn[STEPS]; // bitmaks of proposals we’ve seen after each
byte best [STEPS];
byte btkt [STEPS];
byte picked; // which proposal this node picked this round
bit done; // set to true when round complete
}
typedef Node {
Round round[ROUNDS]; // each node’s per−consensus−round information
}
Node node[N]; // all state of each node
// Calculate n number of bits set in byte v
inline nset (v, n) {
atomic{
int i ;
n = 0;
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for ( i : 0 .. 7) {
if
:: ((v & (1 << j)) != 0)−> n++;
:: else −> skip;
fi
}
}
}
proctype NodeProc(byte n) {
byte rnd, tkt , step , seen , scnt , prsn , best , btkt , nn;
byte belig , betkt , beseen , k;
// bool correct = (n < T);
// printf (”Node %d correct %d\n”, n, correct);
for (rnd : 0 .. ROUNDS−1) {
atomic{
// select a ”random” (here just arbitrary ) ticket
select ( tkt : 1 .. TICKETS);
node[n ]. round[rnd ]. ticket = tkt ;
// we’ve already seen our own proposal
prsn = 1 << n;
// finding the ”best proposal” starts with our own...
best = n;
btkt = tkt ;
} // atomic
// Run the round to completion
for ( step : 0 .. STEPS−1) {
// ”send” the broadcast for this time−step
node[n]. round[rnd ]. sent [ step ] = 1;
// collect a threshold of other nodes’ broadcasts
seen = 1 << n; // we’ve already seen our own
scnt = 1;
do
:: // Pick another node to try to ’ receive ’ from
select (nn : 1 .. N); nn−−;
if
:: (( seen & (1 << nn)) == 0) &&
(node[nn].round[rnd ]. sent [ step ] != 0) −>
atomic {
// printf (”%d received from %d\n”, n, nn);
seen = seen | (1 << nn);
scnt++;
// Track the best proposal we’ve seen
if
:: step == 0 −>
prsn = prsn | (1 << nn);
if
:: node[nn].round[rnd ]. ticket < btkt−>
best = nn;
btkt = node[nn].round[rnd ]. ticket ;
:: node[nn].round[rnd ]. ticket == btkt −>
best = 255; // means tied
:: else −> skip
fi
// Track proposals we’ve seen indirectly
:: step > 0−>
prsn = prsn | node[nn].round[rnd ]. prsn[ step−1];
if
:: node[nn].round[rnd ]. btkt [ step−1]< btkt−>
best = node[nn].round[rnd ]. best [ step−1];
btkt = node[nn].round[rnd ]. btkt [ step−1];
:: (node[nn].round[rnd ]. btkt [ step−1] == btkt) && (node[nn].round[rnd]. best [ step−1] != best) −>
best = 255; // tied
:: else −> skip
fi
fi
} // atomic
:: else −> skip
fi
// Threshold test : have we seen enough?
if
:: scnt >= T−> break;
:: else −> skip;
fi
od
atomic {
// Record what we’ve seen for the benefit of others
node[n ]. round[rnd ]. seen[ step ] = seen;
node[n ]. round[rnd ]. prsn[ step ] = prsn;
node[n ]. round[rnd ]. best [ step ] = best ;
node[n ]. round[rnd ]. btkt [ step ] = btkt ;
printf (”%d step %d complete: seen %x best %d ticket %d\n”, n, step, seen, best, btkt );
} // atomic
}
atomic {
// Find the best propposal we can determine to be eligible .
// We deem a proposal to be eligible if we can see that
// it was seen by at least f+1 nodes by time t+1.
// This ensures that ALL nodes at least know of its existence
// (though not necessarily its eligibility ) by t+2.
belig = 255; // start with a fake ’ tie ’ state
betkt = 255; // worst possible ticket value
beseen = 0;
for (nn : 0 .. N−1) {
// determine number of nodes that knew of nn’s proposal
// by time t+2.
int nnseen = 0;
for (k : 0 .. N−1) {
if
:: ((node[n]. round[rnd ]. seen [2] & (1 << k)) != 0) && ((node[k].round[rnd]. prsn [1] & (1 << nn)) != 0)−> nnseen++;
:: else −> skip
fi
}
// printf (”%d from %d nnseen %d\n”, n, nn, nnseen);
if
:: (nnseen >= Fa+1) && // nn’s proposal is eligible
(node[nn].round[rnd ]. ticket < betkt) −> // is better
belig = nn;
betkt = node[nn].round[rnd ]. ticket ;
beseen = nnseen;
// printf (”%d new belig %d ticket %d seen %d\n”, n, belig, betkt, beseen );
:: (nnseen >= Fa+1) && // nn’s proposal is eligible
(node[nn].round[rnd ]. ticket == betkt ) −> // is tied
belig = 255;
beseen = 0;
:: else −> skip
fi
}
printf (”%d best eligible proposal %d ticket %d seen by %d\n”, n, belig, betkt , beseen );
// we should have found at least one eligible proposal !
assert ( betkt < 255);
// The round is now complete in terms of picking a proposal .
node[n]. round[rnd ]. picked = belig ;
node[n]. round[rnd ]. done = 1;
// Can we determine a proposal to be definitely committed?
// To do so , we must be able to see that :
//
// 1. it was seen by t+2 by ALL nodes we have info from.
// 2. we know of no other proposal competitive with it .
//
// #1 ensures ALL nodes will judge this proposal as eligible ;
// #2 ensures no node could judge another proposal as eligible .
if
:: ( belig < 255) && (beseen >= T) && (belig == best)−>
printf (”%d round %d definitely committed\n”, n, rnd);
// Verify that what we decided doesn’t conflict with
// the proposal any other node chooses.
select (nn : 1 .. N); nn−−;
assert (!node[nn].round[rnd ]. done ||
(node[nn]. round[rnd ]. picked == belig ));
:: ( belig < 255) && (beseen < T)−>
printf (”%d round %d failed due to threshold\n”, n, rnd);
:: ( belig < 255) && (belig != best ) −>
printf (”%d round %d failed due to spoiler\n”, n, rnd );
:: ( belig == 255) −>
printf (”%d round %d failed due to tie\n”, n, rnd);
fi
} // atomic
}
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}init {
atomic {
int i ;
for ( i : 0 .. N−1) {
run NodeProc(i)
}
}
}
B.2 run.sh: Model checking script
# !/ bin/sh
# Exhaustively analyze the QSC model using the Spin model checker .
spin −a qsc.pml
gcc −O2−DSAFETY−DBITSTATE−o pan pan.c
./ pan −m20000
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